

fact, resistance as a subjective mode. w<sup>h</sup>., upon reflection, be seen, (Sir W. Hamilton holds) to be a relative, having for its correlative (the consciousness of which is therefore necessarily involved in our consciousness of resistance as an organic mode) a degree of outward force or pressure opposed to our locomotive energy. A person exerting a muscular effort, and feeling that the limb which he essays to move is impeded, cannot be conscious of resistance in this phasis, as an effort of self, an organic mode, without at the same time being conscious of it in its other phasis, as a force which is not self-opposing the attempted movement of his organism. It may thus be understood how relations in space of the corporeal organism to what is extraorganic, as well as relations in space of the organism to itself, fall within the reach of the perceptive faculty. Modes of resistance are immediately apprehended in the organism, as actual phenomena; this is sensation. In and along with the immediate apprehension of the fact of their existence, comes a consciousness of the mutual relation<sup>s</sup> of outness in which they stand to one another; this is perception, revealing the organism as extended. But still further, in the same indivisible act of consciousness, we apprehend our organism standing in the relation to something extraorganic, of being resisted by it; this is perception recognising the existence of extraorganic objects. We do not indeed immediately know that what resists our locomotive energy is body or matter: we only learn in course of time, mediately, through induction, to connect pressure with bodies. But even prior to induction, immediately, in and along with sensations of resistance, and the accompanying perception of relations of extension in our organism, we have a knowledge of a resisting extraorganic something—whether identical with matter, or in any way connected therewith, deponent (to wit consciousness) saith not.

We remarked when speaking of sensation, that, in virtue of the union betwixt the mind and the animated organism, the special affec-

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other? By no means. Extension is not supposed to be apprehended in the consciousness of the affections A and B as actual phenomena; but only in the consciousness of their mutual outness. If, however, neither the affection A *per se*, nor the affection B *per se*, reveals the organism as extended, then all that is fairly implied in the mutual outness of A and B, is, that the organism is plural, compound, having the locus of one element here, and that of another there—which is a very different thing from saying that it is a continuously extended substance, or composed of elements which possess continuous extension. Even though the organism of our bodies were known to exist as a congeries of elements external to one another, it might still be the case that matter did not possess extension in the proper sense of the term; in other words, matter might not be a substance in which different points could be taken, such that the substance would stretch as an unbroken *continuum* from one of them to the rest.