

policies more effective and they had all thought that one of the things which should be emphasized most strongly in NATO information work was the fact that the Soviet Union, far from being the champion of oppressed people struggling to be free, was the greatest colonial power in history. The Ministers had agreed that every attempt should be made to expose the falseness of Soviet intentions. The Committee of Three would look into the possibility of a collective information policy for NATO countries, but even if this proved to be impossible, the national information policies of the governments which had resources for that purpose should emphasize this inconsistency in the Soviet position.

There were many glaring examples of the colonial oppression practised by the Soviet Union—for example, the peoples now living in the U.S.S.R. as Soviet States had not been given a chance to express their own view as to whether or not they wished to be part of the Soviet Union. Then there were the satellite states which were still under Moscow's control. Above all, there was the graphic example of East Germany, which was a communist colony. The Soviet Government had made it perfectly clear that they would not permit any expression of the will of the people in East Germany at the present time, not merely because it might mean that East Germany would join with a United Germany in NATO, but also because they had insisted that the social and economic benefits of the East Germans must be preserved. Thus there could be no unification of Germany unless all of Germany is willing to become a Communist State and partake of these "social and economic benefits", even though the East Germans have so little regard for these benefits that about 1,000 of them are trying every day to cross the border into West Germany in order to escape them.

Mr. Stick enquired whether any consideration had been given by NATO to means of reaching the people in the U.S.S.R. and satellite states in order to inform them of our conception of freedom and Western democratic ideals. Mr. Pearson replied that there was no suggestion that this should be done by NATO itself at the present time. NATO had not the resources to do this and the governments which were in a position to engage in this type of activity, particularly the United States, had not yet come to a point where they would prefer a propaganda effort planned and carried out by an international agency such as NATO to their own national propaganda effort. Mr. Pearson pointed out that this whole question of NATO information policy was one of the many subjects which the Committee of Three would have to look into.

NATO and the U.N. Security Council

In reply to a question by Mr. Fleming, M.P. for Eglinton, Mr. Pearson stated that he believed that many people in India and other Asian countries considered NATO to be not an alternative to the United Nations Security Council but a substitute for it. Many Asian people believed that the Western nations preferred the NATO arrangement because they could work better together in a western organization of this kind than in the United Nations where Asian and Communist countries were represented, and that the members of NATO were trying to replace the Security Council by the NATO Council. Mr. Pearson stated that this had not been the intention of the Western nations. They had always stated that NATO was the foundation of their collective defence policy *now*, but that it was a "second best" arrangement and that when it was possible to bring about collective security on a United Nations basis, there would be no need for NATO as a security organization. There would,