

possible strengthening of RVN forces and made no mention of USA. He expressed hope that we would be prepared to instruct you to make representations to President Diem.

3. We said that we did indeed regard difficulties of Polish Delegation as a matter of concern to whole Commission, just as we would regard any similar difficulties which might arise in DRVN. Candel's position on this had already been made clear to RVN authorities. While we were not sure that any further representations were necessary at this time, Polish request would be considered. As for background, it was as he must know a fact that RVN had for a long time been dissatisfied with inability of Commission for one reason or another to deal with RVN charges that assassinations and other acts disturbing public tranquility in South Vietnam were instigated and directed by DRVN. This dissatisfaction had reached present proportions as result of brutal Nam murder. It was our hope that Polish Delegation's present difficulties would be overcome and that ICSC would then be able to get down to business. Laszcz made no comment on this except to reiterate appreciation of his government for attitude of Candel and request that we consider urgently whether we could do more.

[HOWARD GREEN]

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*Extrait d'une lettre de la Commission internationale
de surveillance et de contrôle pour le Vietnam
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Extract of Letter from International Commission
for Supervision and Control for Vietnam,
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

LETTER NO. 245

Saigon, November 3, 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

MONTHLY REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES OF THE IC – OCTOBER 1961

A very critical stage in the existence of the IC was reached during October. Characteristically the difficulties faced by the Commission during this period did not arise from its activities but rather from its inactivity as viewed and interpreted by both the North and the South. (In the North we were criticized for not taking action on the alleged interference of the U.S. in South Vietnam and its violations of the Geneva Agreements.)

2. The most significant development for the Commission in its relations with the South was first the kidnapping of Colonel Nam, Chief of the Liaison Mission in Charge of Relations with the IC and then the discovery of his body showing that he had been tortured and murdered.

3. We were initially informed of the disappearance on October 3 in a note from the Foreign Minister which blamed the Viet Cong for sabotaging the activities of the IC and requested the IC to use its authority to obtain the release of Colonel Nam. Because of Polish intransigence and Indian reluctance to act without unanimity there was at first no Commission reaction or expression of sympathy, even on humanitarian grounds. The Canadian Delegation, however, on its own sent a letter to the Foreign Minister expressing its sympathy and hope that Colonel Nam would return safely to his home and position.

4. No action was taken by the Commission until October 16 when the 631st formal meeting was called at the instigation of the Polish Delegation to discuss the press campaign against the IC to which the Poles took strong exception, with the note of October 3 as an added reference. No agreement was reached as the Polish Delegation wanted to send a letter of protest to the GRVN about the press campaign while the Indian Delegation wanted to combine this protest