

2. At the 10th session of the General Assembly (1955) Canada sided with France in opposing inscription.<sup>6</sup> At the 11th session the Canadian delegate expressed doubt as to the wisdom of discussing a matter which under the United Nations Charter was clearly within the domestic jurisdiction of a member state but welcomed the French decision to present their views on the problem.<sup>7</sup> He then went on to praise France's efforts in Algeria and urged that France be left to work out a solution of the Algerian problem with the elected representatives of the Algerian people. Canada took no further part in the debate but voted against resolutions unacceptable to France and joined in the unanimous adoption of a resolution which expressed the hope that "in a spirit of co-operation, a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found, through appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter".

3. French tactics at the forthcoming session are not yet certain. It seems likely that they will once again maintain that the United Nations lacks competence in the matter but will not oppose inscription of the item. They will probably, as last year, describe their efforts to achieve a settlement in Algeria through their offer of a cease-fire to be followed by free elections (to the National Assembly in Paris) and negotiations for the future status of Algeria. In support of their assertion that they are making a constructive effort to achieve a solution the French will point to a new statute for Algeria (now being considered by the French Cabinet) which will provide for the division of Algeria into several regions, each with an Assembly and a large measure of autonomy and increased Algerian representation in Paris. They are also likely to dwell on the atrocities of the Algerian Nationalists and their intransigence in refusing to budge from their demand for French acceptance of the principle of Algerian independence as a prior condition to political negotiations on the future of the territory.

4. The French plan for Algeria, to the extent that it has been revealed, does not retreat from their previous stand that Algerian independence is out of the question. This will prove unacceptable to the Afro-Asian bloc. This bloc may submit a condemnatory or critical resolution. Even our abstention on such a resolution, while it would be welcome to the declared opponents of France, might influence a number of uncommitted countries to do likewise and thereby increase the possibility of an adverse vote. It would be very strongly resented by the French Government.

5. We should not lose sight of the fact that as the history of the Algerian Nationalists' struggle for independence lengthens, so support grows for their cause in the uncommitted countries of the world. Our continued support for France in the United Nations on this issue could therefore be misconstrued and we would lay ourselves open to accusations that we are supporting the maintenance of a colonial régime against the wishes of the people concerned.

6. Informal consultations in London reveal that the United Kingdom has decided to support the French position. They and the United States have, however, strongly urged the French that something must be done to improve their case on Algeria in time to avoid a nasty battle in the United Nations. It is suggested that in the circumstances the Delegation be instructed to do what it can behind the scenes to bring about a reasonable compromise resolution that will avoid an open break on this issue between the Afro-Asian group and the West. What we have in mind would be to contribute towards producing the kind of compromise resolution (quoted in paragraph 2) which was eventually adopted in the

<sup>6</sup> Voir/See Volume 21, Document 94.

<sup>7</sup> Voir/See Volume 22, Document 345.