

nor the evidences of such guarantee. But, after all, were this the true explanation, the possession of such certitude would be valueless, for—the owner being powerless to transfer so superhumanly implanted, and so purely subjective, a gift—the certitude becomes as useless to others as the water of crystallization in a Sahara rock to a parched Arab, or the latent heat of an ice-floe to a freezing Lap.

B. From certain expressions used with reference to the nature of this illative sense—expressions such as a “present imagination” which “reaches to conclusions above and beyond” “methodical processes of inference;” ⁽¹⁵⁾ a “natural, uncultivated faculty, sometimes approaching to a gift;” ⁽¹⁶⁾ a “native good sense;” ⁽¹⁷⁾ a “personal gift;” ⁽¹⁸⁾ or “habit;” ⁽¹⁹⁾ *etc.*, we might very pardonably conjecture that this sense was a sort of logical *clairvoyance*, which overleapt the bounds of ordinary reasoning, and was only saved from the epithet of irrational by the fact that its exploits were utterly inconceivable. True, we do sometimes appear to avail ourselves of an indefinable power of choice.

“It lies not in our power to love or hate,
For will in us is over-ruled by fate,
When two are stript, long ere the course begin,
We wish that one should lose, the other win;
And one especially do we affect
Of two gold ingots, like in each respect.
The reason no man knows; let it suffice,
What we behold is censured by our eyes.”⁽²⁰⁾

But if I may be allowed the saying *videntem dicere verum quid vetat?* I can compare such lawless *per saltum* conclusion to nothing better than to the trick of projecting a coin into the air to determine which of

15. Ch. viii. § 2.
16. Ch. viii. § 3
17. Ch. ix. § 3

18. Ch. viii. § 2.
19. Ch. viii. § 2.
20. *Hero and Leander*. Marlowe. 1st Seetiad.