

many cases bolstering their economies. In fact, however, the preponderance of the United States in the Western World has been so great that it has necessarily held a position not only of leadership but of authority. To an admirable extent, throughout this period, the United States was open to influence by its friends but it played a determinant rather than just a participatory role in its global sphere of influence. This, of course, is how it looks to a Canadian, an Englishman or a German. If I were suddenly to be translated to the State Department in Washington (which God forbid), no doubt I would feel frustrated and embattled by what appeared to be the intransigence and narrow self-interest of my friends, driven to make concession after concession against my own *enlightened* self-interest.

John Foster Dulles, though not "present at the creation" with President Truman and Secretary Acheson, had a profound effect on world power relations in the bi-polar phase. He believed implicitly that "they that are not for us are agin us". He played his part in strengthening the free world against a clear Soviet threat. Perhaps inevitably, his diplomacy brought about a hardening of attitudes on both sides that may have helped to prolong the Cold War. What is certain today is that we live in a world very different from the one he knew and helped to build.

The great changes in world power relations that have taken place have been incubating for a decade or more, have come to light only within the last few years. They are two in number -- the Soviet response to the long-standing efforts of the West for a reduction of tension and the emergence upon the world scene of China. And here I am not forgetting the developments in Western Europe and Japan. The enlarged Common Market and Japan are now great powers in economic terms and can become so politically. For the purposes of this speech I will discuss them a little later. Clearly these two great developments are linked. Rivalry between the Soviet Union and China is one of the root causes for the slow and hesitant Soviet *rapprochement* toward the West. There are others -- growing self-confidence on the part of the Soviets, their acceptance as a power with world-wide interests, which has reduced their sense of being an embattled fortress, their growing need for Western technology and increasing trade between the socialist and market economies.

Canada has been playing a quiet but effective role in the search for *détente*. In NATO we have been leaders in the move from confrontation to negotiation. As we welcome President Nixon's planned visit to Moscow this year, we remember that Mr. Pearson, then in the portfolio I now hold, visited Moscow in 1955, 16 years ago, at the beginning of the thaw. I was fortunate to be with him and helped to negotiate the first trade agreement between our two countries.

For some years we have worked carefully but steadily to increase our contacts with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. There have been many ministerial visits in both directions; trade agreements and exchange agreements of various kinds have been reached, to the benefit of all concerned. Looked at in perspective, the visit Mr. Trudeau paid to the Soviet Union and Mr. Kosygin's return visit to Canada last year did not signal a