

But it must be admitted that our achievements in arms control are not overly impressive when compared to the magnitude of the task, and this is the third facet of disarmament brought out by the tabling of the non-proliferation treaty. The proposed draft would not reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world; it would only help to hold the line at the number of countries now possessing them. This would be a contribution to the control of arms, but it would not be disarmament. The same is true of all the examples which I listed a few moments ago. We have restricted weapons in some ways, but we have not really begun the enormous task of getting rid of these "engines of destruction" or even of reducing our arms expenditures.

The fourth point about disarmament which is brought home by the non-proliferation treaty is that, although disarmament measures undoubtedly improve the international atmosphere, they are more the result than the cause of political agreement. At a time when relations are strained because of the Vietnam and Middle East conflicts, the tabling of the non-proliferation treaty should contribute to an easing of tensions between East and West. The treaty itself, however, is the product, not so much of technical agreement, as of the recognition of certain political realities in various parts of the world. Thus, in the future, we shall be able to take real steps forward only if we have allayed the fears and mistrust which exist in both East and West. That is why Canada considers efforts to "build bridges to the East" to be so important - they lay the groundwork for political, and then arms control, arrangements.

Finally, the non-proliferation treaty negotiations have given us a good idea of the characteristics which must be embodied in any disarmament agreement if it is to be generally acceptable. It is clear, for example, that grandiose disarmament schemes, which are so attractive on paper, demand too much from a suspicious world. We shall only make solid advances through a step-by-step approach which will permit difficulties to be broken down gradually. For over two and a half years, the negotiators in Geneva and in the United Nations in New York, and the political leaders of many countries, have been concentrating their efforts on one particular disarmament objective - and the work has not yet ended. Even with the tabling of a draft non-proliferation treaty, more hard negotiations will be required to hammer out a text which will be accepted and signed by most of the countries of the world. We can expect that all disarmament agreements will require the same patient, unspectacular but persistent effort. In addition, the problems of verification and safeguards will have to be taken into account.

Much of the controversy surrounding the non-proliferation draft has come from the question of whether countries might be able to act clandestinely to circumvent the treaty's provisions. So also with any disarmament agreement. Before agreeing to restrictions on their armaments, countries will have to be satisfied that potential adversaries could not secretly break the rules and thereby obtain a significant military advantage.

Even as I discuss these principles and guide-lines to agreement, however, I realize, as you must also, that there are pressures in the opposite direction. That, while we talk of the importance of ending and reversing the