reducing the issues of stratification and systemic change to a "simple distinction between the great powers and the rest". ³⁷

In his later works Bull, in particular, did begin to shift this focus a little concentrating, for example, on the conduct of the major powers in their dealings with Third World societies. But even here he continued to invoke a 19th century Concert of Europe model as integral to any solution to the North/South problem, on the basis that it was under the auspices of the European great powers that an international society was developed which begat a "state of progressive development" globally, centred on concerns for human rights, liberal individualism and the rule of international law. ³⁸

Bull clearly did not intend to be insensitive or narrowly ethnocentric in this early articulation of the realism-as liberal -institutionalism theme. But the problem was not one of intent anyway. It was one of a Westphalian based framing regime which, as Fitzpatrick noted, sought to transform a historical particular - the European state system - into a universal 'good' while transposing the elitist perspectives of the European great powers into a positive and necessary model of rules and norms for all global history and society, including that in the Antipodes. ³⁹

In Robison and Goodman's terms, of course, this is an exemplary articulation of the Western convergance thesis which they warned of in the context of Australian foreign policy and our future engagements with the Asia/Pacific region. In the broader context of this paper the focus on convergence, on ruling state elites, systemic voluntarism, and 'globalisation from above', represents one of the more obvious legacies of the Westphalian tradition in contemporary IR thinking. In Australia, it is one of the more problematic legacies of an uncritical English School orthodoxy.

Which brings me back to my original concern about the Australian foreign policy debate in the 1990s - which is that there is no genuine debate. Or, rather, that what debate there is reflects one dimension or another of a Westphalian model which, for all its updated promise, continues to effectively restrict the range and nature of the Australian policy agenda to the conceptual and political preferences of a three-centuries long Western power hierarchy. As a framework for understanding and successfully engaging with the Asia/Pacific region in the 1990s, I suggest, this creates

³⁷See, J. Fitzpatrick, "The Anglo-American School of International Relations: The Tyranny of Ahistorical Culturalism" in <u>Australian Outlook</u> 41 (1) 1987:46

³⁸See H. Bull and A. Watson eds. <u>The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press</u>, 1984) p. 125

³⁹See J. Fitzpatrick "The Anglo-American School of International Relations" op. cit. 1987: 47