

exclusively on exchanges of information about military activities, and broad, referring to the availability of information on all security-related matters.¹⁵ Recent years have seen a number of initiatives aimed at increasing transparency in both military and the wider security spheres. The UN Conventional Arms Register, the bilateral China/India Agreement on Confidence building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, and the multilateral (starting as bilateral) Shanghai Agreement between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, and Tajikistan on confidence building in the military field in the border area are examples. These agreements are aimed at reducing the likelihood of conflicts through carefully elaborated measures to make sudden military activities at once difficult and easily detectable. In the UNCAR case, it is the concern with any excessive accumulation of conventional weapons in particular countries/regions that is the focus. Other countries make their security-related activities more transparent by publishing defense white papers and providing accountable, itemized defense budget information. However, these are far and between, and the notion of transparency has yet to overcome the still strong resistance against exposing "secrets" the preservation of which is regarded imperative for national security. It has been argued that while great powers like the United States can afford transparency (indeed, there has been suggestion the Pentagon may deliberately make its counter-proliferation planning/measures "transparent" so as to deter any contemplation of the use of WMDs by potential adversaries), countries not so endowed may feel vulnerable should their military planning, structure, and capabilities be exposed. Again, to counter the argument that transparency as thus conceived may actually undermine rather than enhance security, there is the need to emphasize that transparency must be seen as a process whose aim is not so much the access to exhaustive information about things military as it is about the willingness (or the lack of it) to share information to promote trust and build confidence.

Verification

Verification, including on-site inspections (OSI), and transparency are important ingredients of the process of confidence building and CBMs. It is equally true in regional security frameworks and arms control and disarmament in general. In the latter case, one may suggest the very success of all NACD agreements depends on compliance of all parties, in spirit as well as in letter. As a recent study suggests, "an arms control verification regime consists of the totality of measures, procedures and methods for acquiring the information necessary to assure compliance, deter non-compliance and/or resolve ambiguous events on the part of the parties to an arms control agreement."¹⁶ Verification itself does not imply distrust; rather, it is both a norm enforcer and a confidence building measure. The key point lies in how to use various verification mechanisms in a least intrusive, least expensive way to achieve the maximum in

¹⁵ Alan Crawford, "Transparency and the NACD Process," paper presented at the Canada-China seminar on Asia-Pacific multilateralism and cooperative security, Ottawa, 30 January 1997.

¹⁶ Patricia Bliss McFate et al., *The Converging Roles of Arms Control Verification, Confidence-Building Measures, and Peace Operations: Opportunities for Harmonization and Synergies* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1994).