

Council consult together to obtain agreement on the proposal. After discussion, the United States proposal was adopted by 38 votes in favour (including Canada), 6 against and 11 abstentions. The problem was thus referred to the Interim Committee.

88. Subsequently the Interim Committee was formed and a Sub-committee was appointed to consider this problem. Canada was appointed as a member of this Sub-committee. In the course of its meetings, the Sub-committee examined in great detail over ninety possible decisions which the Security Council might make and made recommendations in regard to the vast majority of these possible decisions. These recommendations, which have now been adopted by the Interim Committee would set out in great detail those decisions of the Security Council which should be considered procedural; and those decisions which, whether procedural or not, should be subject to a decision by the affirmative vote of any seven members of the Council. Canada strongly supported these recommendations of the Sub-committee. If given final approval, they will go far to limit the application of the veto to matters arising out of Chapter VII of the Charter. This would be in accordance with the views of the great majority of the members of the United Nations. The Sub-committee also considered and rejected another Argentine proposal that a general conference be called under Article 109 of the Charter to consider amendment of the Charter. This proposal was later adopted in a modified form by the Interim Committee. In opposing this proposal in the Sub-committee, the Canadian representative stated his country's view that it would be best, first of all, to continue to make every effort to liberalize voting procedure in the Council by voluntary agreement. If such efforts proved fruitless, the question of a general conference could then be considered again.

89. The Canadian view on this whole question of voting procedure in the Council as it relates to pacific settlement was set forth in a memorandum submitted by the Canadian delegation to the General Assembly on November 30, 1946. This memorandum reads in part as follows: "The special voting position in the Security Council of its permanent members imposes on each of them special responsibilities, since failure by any one of them to agree with certain decisions supported by the requisite number of other members of the Council might prevent the Council from exercising its functions as the supreme agency of international conciliation. In view of these special responsibilities, each permanent member is under an obligation to all the other members of the United Nations not to use its special voting position to obstruct the work of the Council .... Under the proviso to paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter, a party to a dispute is required to abstain from voting in decisions under Chapter VI. This proviso would be rendered of no effect if a permanent member of the Security Council could veto a decision that a dispute exists or that it is, itself, a party to a dispute. Therefore, the Security Council should work out agreed procedures to ensure that no State is judge in its own cause."

90. The view of the Canadian Government in regard to the San Francisco Statement was given in the Security Council on May 21 of this year when the Czechoslovak question was being considered. The Canadian representative then said: "In the view of the Canadian delegation, this document was of importance for the purpose of clarifying the views of the sponsoring governments at the San Francisco Conference. In fact, as has been pointed out a number of times, it was on the clear undertaking on the part of the sponsoring governments that they would not use their veto 'wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council', that the other members of the United Nations acquiesced in the voting procedure proposed, which, otherwise, would have been far from satisfactory to them." He