

and decision". Moreover, this end had to be reconciled with the hard fact that questions before the Council "will necessarily have to be judged not only on their merits but also with reference to the way in which the present distribution of power in the world will be affected by a decision one way or the other" and that "on fundamental questions which may involve peace and war, we cannot afford to be on the opposite side from the United States and the United Kingdom when they are in agreement".

16. The final paragraphs of the statement provided an analysis of some of the weaknesses of the Security Council which its operations had revealed and of practices which had developed to the detriment of the Council's effectiveness, as for example, the tendency of certain States to "regard the United Nations as little more than an instrument for the attainment of narrow national objectives", and states raising in the Security Council "problems in their relations with other States which they have not been able to solve to their own satisfaction and hope that by doing so they will gain the sanction of international support". Related to these tendencies was the "irresponsible use of the Security Council ... for the purpose of making propaganda". The net result was to lead the Security Council into a discussion of minor questions which should not appear on its agenda at all. The Security Council should not be asked to accept commitments which it could not fulfil for, in the:

" Absence of military agreements under Article 43 of the Charter or alternative arrangements for similar purposes, the Security Council is not in a position to enforce its decisions or to give military support to commissions or other agencies which it may appoint".

The statement also noted a tendency on the part of the Great Powers to expect the smaller powers on the Security Council to "accept responsibilities which they themselves are anxious to avoid". The reason which the Great Powers gave for this practice was that they were too directly concerned with the dispute under consideration. This, the statement noted, was not wholly valid since in theory at least, every member of the Security Council should act in the interests of the United Nations as a whole, but in practice it were:

" Impossible for the members of the Security Council to detach themselves from their national interests sufficiently ... it is doubtful if the Council can go far towards the solution of major problems".

17. The year 1948 marked the beginning of a shift in emphasis in the Department's thinking on the problems of security away from the United Nations and towards the proposed North Atlantic Treaty. In a forthright speech delivered before the Toronto Board of Trade on January 28 of that year, Mr. Pearson referred to "the lack of concrete accomplishments that provokes grave doubts about the capability of the organization to do the job it was given, to keep the peace". He pointed out that the United Nations had been founded "on the ability and desire of the Great Powers to work together for peace" but that because of the "embitterment and intensification of ideological and political conflicts between the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, each watched the other across a widening chasm of suspicion and mistrust". The resultant political climate brought out the structural weaknesses of the Charter, although he doubted that even a perfect Charter in such a climate could guard peace and security. The abuse of the veto