

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

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I would now like to make a few comments on the question of a chemical-weapons ban. A definite amount of success has recently been achieved in the drafting of the chemical-weapons convention. Many positions of principle and specific technical issues have been reconciled and there is the necessary basis for further progress. Amongst the unresolved questions of principle is the question of on-site challenge inspection. At this stage of the negotiations this is a basic problem of universal significance for the convention.

What is the actual situation as regards the solution of this problem? Several positions have been stated in the negotiations. Each of them reflects the interests of one or another group of delegations or the interests of specific delegations. These interests have to be taken into account and brought into line with the common aim: the elaboration of a convention which can universally and really be implemented.

The socialist countries are in favour of a régime of challenge inspections which would be as effective as possible and, at the same time, would not be detrimental to the higher interests of States. This aim, we feel, is met by the approach set out in the proposal of the United Kingdom contained in document CD/715, and in particular the central idea of that proposal -- the possibility of proposing and applying alternative measures.

It seems to us that the proposal that challenge verifications concerning declared locations and facilities and also in cases of suspicion of the use of chemical weapons should be mandatory is a promising one from the point of view of finding a compromise. Perhaps we should think about those other cases which we could include in the list of those where a refusal to allow full verification to be carried out would not be allowable.

For many years it was impossible to agree on questions of verifying the destruction of chemical weapon stocks and the elimination of their production facilities, as well as the permitted sphere of activities.

The proposals made by the Soviet delegation take account of the position of the Western and non-aligned States and fully remove any obstacle to the elaboration of comprehensive and strict control over chemical weapon stocks, production facilities and permitted activities. On these issues we have practically all the necessary basis for the formulation of articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Nevertheless, unfortunately, we cannot but note certain negative factors which are delaying the consolidation of the success achieved: for example, the unexpected difficulties which have arisen in resolving questions such as diversion of chemical weapons (the delegation of the United States of America has departed from its earlier position just when the USSR