supporting neutral and non-aligned proposals that working groups with negotiating mandates should be established for these issues, an idea which the United States would not countenance. There was consequently an inherent asymmetry to the CD debates, which placed a premium on Western group cohesion. The mandate issue, and Soviet support for the postures of the Group of 21, however, veiled from CD view the extent to which the United States and the Soviet Union were fundamentally at one over matters nuclear. This still remained true for the strategy of nuclear deterrence, and it would always remain true for the existing nonproliferation regime. As Alan Neidle has observed, "the NPT remains the most important and far-reaching project embodying the mutual interests of the two countries in the field of multilateral arms control."17 Indeed, their concern for the NPT regime binds the two superpowers to multilateral arms control. Yet it was this issue, especially in the wake of the failure of the 1980 NPT Review Conference to conclude on their terms, which most exercised the Group of 21, and which made them all the more determined to focus in the CD on nuclear disarmament and a CTB. Under the vigorous leadership of four NPT-holdouts, a rather unholy alliance between Argentina, Brazil, India and Pakistan, the Group of 21 demanded that the superpowers move ahead in these arms control fields to signal their commitment to do so under the terms of the NPT.

Yet the NPT remains the most important arms control instrument in effect for technologically advanced Western non-nuclear states such as Canada and Australia. As purveyors of peaceful nuclear equipment and technology, or as exporters of uranium, they have a clear stake in a stable non-proliferation regime. And, since the entry into force of the NPT in 1970, they have contributed significantly to the strengthening of the international non-proliferation safeguards regime. With the Netherlands and Sweden at the 1980 NPT Review Conference, Canada and Australia were in the vanguard of the participants at that conference in calling for universal subscription to full-scope safeguards. Accordingly,

¹⁷ Neidle, p. 12.

See Michael Tucker. Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes, Scarborough, Ont.: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980.