108. U. Nerlich, "Missile Defenses ..,", op. cit., pp. 120-121; et D. Sorenson, "Ballistic Missile Defense ...", op. cit., pp. 170-171.

109. Alun Chalfont, Star Wars: Suicide or Survival, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1985, pp. 117-119.

110. D. Yost, "European Anxieties ...", op. cit., p. 122.

111. Voir D. Sorenson, "Ballistic Missile Defense ...", op. cit., pp. 167-169.

112. Voir P. Wilson, "A Missile Defense ...", op. cit., p. 14; l'IDE était justement perçue par l'équipe du "Future Security Strategy Study" (le panel Hoffman), qui fût constitué peu après l'annonce de l'IDS, comme une option intermédiaire attrayante autant d'un point de vue américain qu'européen. En voici les raisons:

> Deployment of anti-tactical missile (ATM) system is an intermediate option that might be available relatively early. The system might combine some advance mid-course and terminal components identified by the Defensive Technologies Study with a terminal underlay. The advanced components, though developed initially in an ATM mode, might later play a role in continental United States (CONUS) defense. Such an option addresses the pressing military need to protect allied forces as well as our own, in theaters of operations, from either non-nuclear or nuclear attack. It would directly benefit our allies as well as ourselves. Inclusion of such an option in our long-range R&D program on ballistic missile defenses should reduce allied anxieties that our increased emphasis on defenses migh indicate a weakening on our commitment to the defense of Europe. We can pursue such a program option within ABM treaty constraints.

Extrait du rapport du panel, publié par Hans Günter Brauch, dans une conférence intitulée Antitactical Missile Defense: Will the European Version of SDI Undermine the ABM Treaty?, publiée par l'International Studies Association, Washington, mars 1985, p. 43 (texte ronéotypé).