involves Federal Intervention, and upon the assumption that the Provincial jurisdiction is exclusive, would be utterly indefensible. But this claim of exclusive Provincial jurisdiction in educational matters has been so thoroughly discredited that it is no longer invoked in serious argument, and has become a mere political shibboleth. The judgment of the Judicial Committee in the Brophy case contains this passage :

"It may be well to notice the argument urged by the Respondents ,that the construction which their Lordships have put upon the second and third sub-sections of section twenty-two of the Manitoba Act, is inconsistent with the power conferred upon the Legislature of the Province to "exclusively make laws in relation to education." The argument is fallacious. The power conferred is not absolute, but limited. It is exercisable only "subject and according to the following provisions." The sub-sections which follow, therefore, whatever be their true construction, define the condition under which alone the Provincial Legislature may legislate in relation to education, and indicate the limitations imposed on, and the exceptions from, their power of exclusive legislation. Their right to legislate is not indeed, properly speaking, exclusive, for in the case specified in sub-section three the Parliament of Canada is authorized to legislate on the same subject. There is therefore no such inconsistency as was suggested."

It would be surprising to see a man of Principal Grant's ability carried away by the Provincial Rights Bugaboo, and it is to be noted that he can scarcely be charged with clearly expressing his acceptance of the view that regard for Provincial Rights, absolutely prohibits Federal Interference. On the contrary the fair conclusion to be drawn from the Principal's language, though it must be confessed there is some ground for the apparent doubt of The Globe, is that he believes that Federal Interference, or rather Federal Legislation should only be resorted to in the direst need, and as a remedy in extremis. If this were all—if this conclusion had been stated without more, few reasonable, moderate men would be found to take exception to it,—though, perhaps it would have been more satisfactory if Dr. Grant had enlightened us by stating, at what stage of the case—after what lapse of time—and in face of what degree of persistency on the part of the Local Government in refusing to grant redress, Federal Interference, would in his opinion become justifiable—if not desirable. But Dr. Grant further qualifies his conclusion by postponing the period for interference, "until it has been proved that substantial grievances exist," meaning thereby, no doubt, grievances of such a character as to justify Federal Intervention, if not otherwise redressed. Here is "the real crux" of the whole question. Dr. Grant himself says in his last letter, "the power of Parliament no one doubts," and in his fifth letter, "the highest authority in the Empire says there is a grievance." But, that the grievance is substantial, justifying, as a last resort, Federal Intervention, Dr. Grant appears to think is yet to be ascertained by investigation, presumably by the Dominion Commission which he suggests in his third letter. It is to be supposed that Dr. Grant did not intend to put himself in conflict with "the highest authority in the Empire" or to dispute the finality of its determination. He must