

session's most significant legacy. During the preparatory meetings and the deliberations at the session, there emerged an increasing realization that the vital, often contradictory, link between peace and security must be faced squarely and dealt with seriously if deliberations on arms control and disarmament are to move beyond the stage of exercises in rhetoric. The realization did not develop directly and coherently. Its many facets appeared in a piecemeal fashion and a perception of the meaning of the whole came more in a manner reminiscent of a pointillist painting or collage. Several examples may serve to illustrate the point.

Participants and observers repeatedly heard statements or drafting language that in effect stated: "Your armaments are dangerous to world peace, therefore you should disarm; but *our* armaments are necessary for our security and self-defence, they are not (as) dangerous to world peace, and therefore should not be included in the deliberations". As non-aligned, neutral and aligned nations alike made these statements, the cumulative effect was an education in sobering reality as it related to such issues as non-proliferation, non-use of nuclear-weapons declarations, conventional weapons or arms-transfer limitations. For many, this experience in articulating their own views, learning of others' views and debating the priorities and different perspectives on arms control and disarmament in a multilateral forum may have engendered a more sophisticated appreciation of the complexity of world peace and security issues.

In the first weeks of the session, numerous commentators and observers noted the irony of a situation in which some heads of state, heads of government and senior ministers spoke about disarmament in New York and then proceeded to Washington to discuss ways of increasing the military capability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Some commentators, however, went on to observe that such itineraries were neither exercises in hypocrisy nor regrettable coincidences but useful and timely reminders that responsible leaders must deal with the real world how-

ever much they might hope for and work to change that world in the direction of peace. Their activities were personal testimonies to one aspect of the contradictory nature of the link between peace and security.

Other intrusions upon the special session deliberations - the war in Zaire, animosities in the Middle East and Cyprus, for example, served as reminders that peace through disarmament is by no means a universal priority - food or justice or freedom are far more important goals for many people in the world. Peace and disarmament are often antithetical to those goals. Even among those who attach the highest priority to peace, there are some whose situations and circumstances are such that the goal will best be achieved by maintaining or improving their military capabilities rather than by limiting or abolishing them. These may have been hard realities for disarmament advocates to face but, to the extent that they were acknowledged at the special session rather than ignored or dismissed, the deliberations inched closer to long-term significance.

Another facet was evident in some of the ideas and proposals put forth in various formal speeches. The Canadian notion of "suffocation" of the arms race by slowing the technologically-induced momentum of arms research and production, the French idea of restricting *surarmament* as a preliminary measure for regional arms limitation, and some of the roles proposed for non-nuclear-weapon states in nuclear-arms control negotiations, are examples of ideas - informed by a careful appreciation of reality - that warrant further examination, elaboration and discussion.

More than 40 years separate the two most recent world conferences on disarmament. While it is not unusual to describe the embarrassingly modest results of previous conferences and to dismiss the UN special session as following that tradition, such a dismissal may be a serious error. The context of multilateral arms-limitation deliberations has changed in many ways since 1932. As the number of states has multiplied dramatically, so have the sources of tension and conflict against which arms are perceived as

the necessary remedy. As scientific and technological knowledge has grown at an exponential rate, so have the sources of arms-production, the means for producing arms and the varieties of arms. As the context has become much more complex, the need to deal with the realities behind the various contemporary arms races becomes more pressing.

While it is true that no swords will be beaten into plowshares as a direct result of the UN special session, what may be accomplished in a world-wide deliberation on extremely sensitive and complex issues appears to be more than the pessimists expected. To the extent that the vital, often contradictory link between peace and security is recognized and becomes the centrepiece of future deliberations, the special session, as a first step in this direction, has made a substantial contribution. St. Augustine identified the problem some 15 centuries ago. The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament showed that the problem posed by Augustine had to be solved before Isaiah's vision could become reality. ■

Diagnosis and prescription

(continued from page 9)

all the members (as in the Security Council). The CCD's membership will consist of the current 31 members plus six to eight new members, including China. It was also agreed that the new committee, like the old CCD, would conduct its work by consensus rather than by vote.

In addition, it was decided that there would be two deliberative bodies, each comprising the full membership of the United Nations. The First Committee of the General Assembly, which now carries out the annual task of review and appraisal of disarmament work, would deal exclusively with disarmament. The Disarmament Commission would follow up the work of the special session and make recommendations on a comprehensive program of disarmament. This latter body would meet between sessions of the General Assembly and would enable those countries that were not members of the negotiating commit-