

allowed the blind and unchecked momentum of the arms race to create and to put at their disposal military capabilities of an order of magnitude that other governments cannot prudently ignore.

In such a situation, there is a risk that foreign policy can become the servant of defence policy, which is not the natural order of policy-making.

There is also a high risk that new weapons systems will revive concerns about a disarming first-strike capability; or that they will tend to blur the difference between nuclear and conventional warfare; or that they will increase problems of verification.

All this suggests that stable deterrence remains an inadequate concept. And an inadequate concept is a poor substitute for genuine world security.

These dangers have been perceived by both major nuclear powers. I believe that both are serious in wanting to arrest the momentum of the nuclear-arms race. They have been engaged in a dialogue on strategic arms limitations for several years. The dialogue has produced some useful quantitative limits and others are under negotiation. But the process is painstaking and, as I have watched it, with a full appreciation of its importance to the security interests of my own country, I have wondered whether there may not be additional concepts that could usefully be applied to it.

The negotiations under way between the major nuclear powers have shown that it is possible to confirm or codify an existing balance of forces. But they have also shown how difficult it is to go beyond that and to cut back on weapons systems once they have been developed and deployed. That is not only because they are there and vested interests have been created in their deployment. It is also because it has proved immensely complex to achieve the magic formula of equal security by placing limits on what are often quite disparate weapons systems.

The conclusion I have reached is that the best way of arresting the dynamic of the nuclear-arms race may be by a strategy of suffocation, by depriving the arms race of the oxygen on which it feeds. This could be done by a combination of four measures. Individually, each of these measures has been part of the arms-control dialogue for many years. It is in their combination that I see them as representing a more coherent, a more efficient and a more promising approach to curbing the nuclear-arms race. The measures I have in mind are:

First, a comprehensive test ban to impede the further development of nuclear-explosive devices. Such a ban is currently under negotiation. It has long been Canada's highest priority. I am pleased that the efforts of Canada's representatives and those of other countries stand a good chance of success during 1978. The computer can simulate testing conditions up to a point. But there is no doubt in my mind that a total test ban will represent a real qualitative constraint on weapons-development.

Second, an agreement to stop the flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles. This would complement the ban on the testing of warheads. I am satisfied that, in the present state of the art, such an agreement can be monitored, as it must be, by national technical means.