

Britain's reaction to his plan to call upon the General Assembly to create an "adequate UN military force to separate the Egyptians from the Israelis." On his arrival in New York, Pearson learned that Britain was ready to "hand over" the Suez Canal "to a UN force strong enough to prevent the renewed outbreak of hostilities between Egypt and Israel." (Documents 119 and 118). This slight concession was enough, and during the debate on the American motion, Pearson sat quietly until the small hours of the morning. Rising at 3 a.m. to explain Canada's abstention, he argued that a resolution calling for a return to the *status quo* was not enough; what was needed was a "UN force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out." (Documents 119 and 120)

After lunch with Hammarskjöld, who was doubtful that Pearson's idea would work, the Secretary of State for External Affairs returned to Ottawa for a Saturday morning Cabinet meeting, where ministers endorsed his proposal for an international peacekeeping force. By now it was clear that the Soviet Union had decided to re-occupy Hungary while the world's attention was diverted, making British and French behaviour "all the more deplorable in that it prevented the free world from taking a united stand, which would probably have had much Asian-Arab support, against this naked aggression." (Document 126)

Following the Cabinet discussion, Léger asked Canada's Ambassador to the United States, Arnold Heeney, to sound out the State Department. Ottawa and Washington soon agreed on a draft UN resolution appointing a five-member committee to "plan for the setting up in the Middle East of an emergency international United Nations force recruited from national military forces immediately available." (Document 127)

Pearson returned to New York late in the afternoon of November 3, bringing the draft with him. There he learned that British reaction to the proposed resolution had been encouraging. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, had even given Robertson the impression "that the resolution was welcome and that ... they might even be able to vote for it." (Document 128) Hopeful that the resolution might stop French and British troops from landing in Egypt, Pearson pressed ahead. After lobbying other UN members for support, he met with the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, and decided to base his resolution on a simpler U.S. draft that asked the Secretary-General alone to develop plans for a UN emergency force. Another late-night session followed before the UN General Assembly adopted the Canadian resolution early in the morning of November 4. (Document 130) Supported by an informal advisory committee, whose work organizing and deploying the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) is documented throughout this chapter, the Secretary-General submitted a plan for a force headed by a Canadian, Major General E.L.M. (Tommy) Burns, to the General Assembly on November 6. It was immediately approved.

Much of the subsequent material in chapter one on the creation of the UNEF deals with the problems created by the slow pace of the French, British and Israeli withdrawal from Egypt, the deployment of the force, and the broader international implications of the Suez Crisis. From the middle of November on, for instance, Pearson was deeply involved in resolving the impasse that resulted when Nasser refused to accept Canadian ground troops as part of the UN force. The Egyptian decision was a personal blow, as the account of Pearson's interview with the Egyptian representative at the UN