jurors that the doubt an accused is entitled to the benefit of is the honest doubt of an honest man who has honestly applied his mind to the evidence; not a doubt conjured up for the occasion to furnish a pretext for giving way to sentiment or sympathy, and to afford a plausible excuse for violating duty. In my part of the country we call a man a "basswood" man who shirks his duty because it is unpleasant—who is a weakling; and I fear that sometimes jurors turn out to be "basswood" men. But that cannot be helped while human nature remains as it is; and our main consolation is that such is the exception. The same thing is noted in England, Ireland, the United States and the whole globe. How can this be helped? Only by every man who is called as a juror determining to do his duty as a man and a citizen—and doing it.

As before we think of any other method of trial, let us carefully consider if any other method would be more free from defects.

I have long been actively engaged in the law Courts, Counsel and Judge; and I give it as my deliberate opinion that a jury of twelve men is in most cases as good a tribunal for determining fact as any other which has ever been devised, and in many cases the best. The Legislature has in some cases, as, for example, in actions against municipalities for damages, said that juries shall not, but a judge shall, try the issues—I presume because it was thought that juries would incline toward the private individual and against the corporation. Other corporations besides municipalities think that jurors are prejudiced against them, and it may be that there is much truth in that supposition. There are other cases involving law or of a commercial or complicated character which it is not well to trouble juries with; but taking the ordinary case of a conflict of fact between man and man I would rely upon a jury arriving at as sound a conclusion as any bench of judges or any other conceivable tribunal.

Criminal cases are peculiarly for the consideration of a jury under the direction of the judge upon the law—the facts are generally simple and easily understood, and in most cases juries can be relied upon to do their duty.

Your President has asked me to speak to you particularly as to certain cases and explain them to you. Some of these I must not say anything about, as they are still in the Courts. Such of them as are finished I shall speak of, as I understand some of you have been troubled about them. When rightly understood, there is no reason, I think, for uneasiness.

In one case a man was charged with murdering his wife by beating her to death. He had been drinking; but at the trial no one thought that there had been such intoxication as would make any difference, and he was convicted. A new trial was ordered; and the idea seems to have got abroad that the law was laid down that drunkenness is an excuse for crime. If that were so, it would indeed be cause for alarm, for then all a man would have to do when he wanted to murder would be to get drunk. But nothing can be further from the fact. This is what the Court said: Where one man kills another, it is murder if he intended to kill. And a man is held to have intended the natural consequences of his acts, so that if he, without an actual intent to kill, does something which he ought to have known to be likely to kill, it is quite the same as if he actually intended to kill. If a man, drunk or sober, intends to kill and does kill, he is guilty of murder; but although he kill, if he did not intend, actually intend, to kill, but did something which he did not intend to cause death, it may be different. If he was in the possession of his faculties, he must be held to intend the natural result of what he did; but if he was so drunk that he did not know that the natural effect of what he did would be to cause death, the case is different. Then he is guilty of manslaughter only. The judge who