

from Rhode Island, or of making the force upon the Hudson's River adequate to offensive operation.

Hence arises my second proposition, that the latitude I had proposed, or other expedients of precaution, ought then at least to have been adopted: instead of which, I was suffered to fail, ignorant of Sir William Howe's plans, and ignorant of the defalcation or the delays in the reinforcements destined for him. The consequence was, that neither his letter to Sir Guy Carleton, put into my hands after my arrival in Canada, nor his letter to me of the 17th of June, informing me of his destination for Pennsylvania, removed my expectation of co-operation, because I was to suppose, that subsequent to the dates of either of those letters, he would receive orders from the secretary of state respecting the junction, and also a timely reinforcement.

Seventh fact. The secretary of state makes no mention of the northern expedition in any of his dispatches to Sir William Howe at the end of March, when my orders were fixed, nor in the month of April. And it is a further fact, that I am persuaded will not be contested, that he did not mention any orders or recommendations relative to co-operation verbally to Sir William Howe's aid-de-camp, or any other confidential person who failed about that time.

The first mention made of the necessity of co-operation was in the secretary of state's letter of the 18th of May, wherein his Lordship "*Trusts that whatever he [Sir William Howe] may meditate, it will be executed in time to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada.*"

The proposition clearly justified by these facts is, that if the secretary of state had thought proper to signify the King's expectation of a co-operation to be made in my favour in the month of March or beginning of April, as in consistency he ought to have done, it would have arrived before Sir William Howe embarked his army, and in time for him to have made a new disposition: but instead of that, this very material injunction was not dispatched till it was almost physically impossible it should have any effect. And so indeed it happened, for Sir William Howe received it on the 16th of August, at a distance from Hudson's River too great for any detachment from his own army to be made in time, could it even have been spared; and the reinforcement from England, upon which Sir William Howe depended to strengthen Sir Henry Clinton, was much later still—too late (as it has been shewn) to enable that general with all his activity and zeal to give any effectual support.

Indeed the conduct of the secretary of state, in inserting this paragraph, in his letter of the 18th of May, when it could not avail, after omitting it when certainly it would have been timely, seems so preposterous, that it can only be explained by one fact. It transpired about that time, that Sir William Howe's army was destined for Pennsylvania, and people who had considered the force of the enemy to be collected from the northern provinces began to be alarmed for my army. It is well known

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