

*External Affairs*

which aims to protect the interests of Canadian producers and provides greater scope for trade. Despite the considerations to which I referred we hope to increase our trade with China in the coming years.

Many Canadians visited China last year and that fact is responsible for increased interest in this topic. We are not unhappy that they have gone there. The reports of their impressions published in the Canadian press have been a source of information to the Canadian public. We hope that more personal contacts can be built up on the basis of these individual visits. In this way, by developing friendly relations in limited sectors, we may break down some of the political distrust which unavoidably exists between Canada—and indeed, the whole western world—and the Peking government.

On the specific issue of the establishment of diplomatic relations as opposed to relations confined to cultural and trade matters and the like, I realize that there are weighty considerations on both sides. As I have mentioned already, there is an opinion that friendly relations will flow from recognition. We believe that we should proceed prudently while we discover to what extent relations with communist China can be improved. We do not see much point in extending recognition to communist China if the result of such an act will be to put us in a position similar to that of other countries which have recognized China and then have been berated and extravagantly attacked because they have not always backed communist China pursuant to what the Peking government feels was an obligation arising out of recognition.

I ask three questions, Mr. Speaker. The first one is this. Should we recognize mainland China until we have reason to believe that our act will not result in deterioration of relations other than the opposite? My second question is this. Should we recognize mainland China if our act will give rise to misinterpretation of our attitude in the countries of Asia; that is, if those countries were to say that since Canada and other western powers have recognized communist China, there is no point in their resisting the growing influence of the Peking government not only in international affairs but in domestic affairs as well. My third question is this. Should we not also bear in mind the effect of recognition by Canada and by other countries on Peking's position among the overseas Chinese in southeast Asia? They might take out of that act of recognition the view that they would be free to undermine the national interest of those countries by being willing then to transfer their loyalties wholly to the Peking regime.

These are questions which we are weighing extremely carefully. It is, moreover, a matter of some concern that in the past year communist China has given us little warrant to believe that they have much conception of their responsibility for the maintenance of world peace. As a result of Mr. Dulles' visit to Taiwan in October last, a joint communique was issued by Chiang Kai-Shek and Mr. Dulles to the effect that the nationalist government would not resort to force as the means of returning to the mainland. It is disturbing to find, however, that no similar renunciation of force has been made by the government of communist China in respect of their intentions towards Formosa and the offshore islands. I am not discussing at this moment the place of the offshore islands but I am merely saying that there is on the part of the Peking government no manifestation of intention corresponding to that which was given by the nationalist government. That is their right. The mere fact that they have not done that is not necessarily an indication that we should not recognize China. But we are equally free to judge that in such circumstances recognition might be of little value and advance none of our interests.

It is for these reasons that it is the view of this government that we must go carefully. We should take the initiative in limited fields—in fields of trade and in other ways to which I have referred—and we should take every opportunity that presents itself to overcome the causes of discord between the west and Peking China. We must be patient. We should not be hasty. Otherwise we may undo the good work that has already been accomplished in laying the basis for progress towards the goal of removing the occasions for misunderstanding now existing between Canada and communist China.

Whether this process will be followed by recognition is to be seen; but I say this emphatically, that it will depend upon the success that we have in improving our relations in limited fields, and our assessment of the advantage to be gained by such an act. We have never stated that we will never recognize the Peking government. In the Prime Minister's words:

The question of the recognition of red China is one that has been receiving consideration for the last several years and the question is continually and continuously before members of the government.

In conclusion, to return to the Berlin and German situations, I would hope that we may develop and extend the areas of understanding in east-west relations through the same technique of improvement, in limited fields. I am bound to say that there is little, if any, agreement on surprise attack. There