

the limit of financial resources available for maritime defence. The Subcommittee accepted the argument advanced by Dr. G. R. Lindsey that "as an absolute minimum it would be desirable to maintain a degree of surveillance to ensure that we do not remain unaware of a large scale increase in activity".

Another National Defence witness elaborated on this requirement in the following terms:

"Surveillance is, of course, of paramount importance... It provides a valuable source of intelligence as to possible enemy intentions. It must be a sustained and continuous process.

However it is not sufficient to know the nature of the enemy deployment at any given time but requires that the normal pattern of deployment be established so as to be able to detect any change in that pattern. Such changes, analyzed in the light of the prevailing political situation and other sources of intelligence can provide warning of an impending attack or of a development of strategic or political importance. Surveillance must therefore be maintained over wide areas of possible missile submarine operation..."

The Subcommittee agreed with Professor Martin's evidence that a capability to carry out active surveillance was important for Canada's security:

"... a limited anti-submarine warfare capability such as is within Canada's competence would ensure a degree of Canadian access because of the information it can produce itself; second because it is a participant of the information that is provided by others and thus would have some control over the information provided by others. This would seem worthwhile having and would seem a major function of it... Canada's security is rather great and is provided by some of the other international deterrent systems. But a certain amount of capability to reconnoitre, to identify behaviours and perhaps even to thwart that behaviour on a very small scale could be regarded as a kind of activating mechanism, a sort of general deterrent balance within which Canada lives."

### **5.3 Future Support for a Seabed Disarmament Treaty**

Canada has been a leading proponent of a Seabed Disarmament Treaty requiring effective inspection capabilities. With a draft U.S.—U.S.S.R. treaty now being discussed, Canada may well become party to such a treaty during the 1973-83 period. Since Canada is a technologically advanced nation with proven expertise in the ASW field, Canada would be in a position to provide inspection capabilities if requested. In terms of both the development of technical expertise and strategic alignment, the Subcommittee concludes that this is a long-term consideration relevant in planning future capabilities of Canadian maritime forces.

## **6. DISCOUNTED STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS**

The Subcommittee examined a number of possible roles and operations of Canadian maritime forces that have been advanced at rationales for the structure of Canadian maritime forces in the past and concluded that they were not realistic. These possible roles have been discounted because they involve scenarios that the Subcommittee considered most improbable or because they