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but also to international arrangements for the provision of PNE services that are fully consistent with the requirements of the NPT and other international legal instruments, including the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. We do not minimize the difficulties involved in devising such arrangements. But it could be much harder to reach agreement on international arrangements to govern PNE services if we wait until whatever economic value they may have has been demonstrated.

The NPT Review Conference confirmed that internationally-recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones can be an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and of strengthening the security of states which become fully bound by their provisions. The nuclear-weapon-free-zone conception and the possibility of establishing such zones in various parts of the world have been the subjects of numerous resolutions of this Assembly in recent years, and will be addressed again this year. Yet, apart from the Antarctic, Latin America is the only area of the world which has been established as a nuclear-weapon-free zone by treaty, and that treaty is still not in force for some important countries of the region. Moreover, its protocols have yet to be adopted by all of the states to which they were designed to apply.

In principle, Canada supports the nuclear-weapon-free-zone concept. Our understanding of this concept has been deepened by the thorough study undertaken in the CCD and presented to the Assembly last year. I wish to stress, however, that, in Canada's view, the value of any specific nuclear-weapon-free zone proposal or arrangement will depend on whether it has or is likely to have the support of most countries of the area concerned -- including, of necessity, the major military powers of the region. It will also depend on a clear definition of the geographic area covered, on assurance that the arrangement would not confer additional military advantage to any state or to any group of states, and on the provisions made for ensuring that all component countries comply fully with the commitments involved and forswear the independent acquisition of nuclear-explosive capability. It is also essential that supplementary arrangements applicable to states outside the region concerned be realistic and fully consistent with generally-recognized principles of international law. Moreover, it is important to recognize that there can be no all-purpose blueprint for nuclear-weapon-free-zone arrangements. Obviously, when requested, the United Nations has a responsibility to assist in the establishment of such arrangements, but the terms of such arrangements cannot be imposed.

Before leaving the question of nuclear proliferation, I want to emphasize the need for a constructive approach to the assessment of

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