

In the present case, it is the governments of the United States and of Saudi Arabia which will have to make the critical determinations about the use of force, since the more collegial structure implied by the Military Staff Committee is not in place, and they are overwhelmingly the largest contributors. Such an approach to decision-making is far from ideal. The United States is no more willing or able to play the long-term role as *gendarme* to the world (even if others could be induced to help finance it) than the rest of the world is keen to see any one state carry that role. There will be grounds to debate American and Saudi rhetoric, tactics and timing but it is critical that the overall strategy of the Security Council, and its resolutions which have the force of law, have the unequivocal support of the government of Canada, and of all Canadians committed to the United Nations.

The time is ripe for the international community to apply more systematically the Canadian "functional principle of representation" under which states are accorded influence on decisions proportionate to their contributions and stakes in the fields in question. The implication is that applying effective police capability would never again be left by default to one power, and that decisions could then be more widely shared, together with the burdens involved. It is worth noting that the Canadian "functional principle", while it was mainly designed to influence the management of the post war world, had its origins in the sometimes stormy conduct of the war effort itself. In fact, one of the first clear articulations of this principle was in a memorandum for the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs on 20 January 1942 in which the author, Hume Wrong, referred to:

"The principle... that each member of the grand alliance should have a voice in the conduct of the war proportionate to its contribution to the general war effort. A subsidiary principle is that the influence of the various countries should be greatest in connection with those matters with which they are most directly concerned."⁵

Much more realism is needed as well, in recognizing that once an aggressor is identified, and the rising scale of sanctions provided in Chapter VII is invoked, the UN is no longer an arbiter – it becomes an adversary of the aggressor, and potentially a military adversary. If the transgressor refuses to comply with the demands and milder pressures of the international community, this adversarial status will grow more stark and more dangerous. The UN is at a tactical disadvantage in having to debate, plan and implement its measures in a fishbowl, and this