

constitute a de facto security relationship, not a security regime. "The present relationship is adequately explained with reference to military and economic power". Although these rules "serve to contain the conflict and prevent significant escalation," they do not resolve the conflict; they perpetuate it. Second, do the conditions exist for the formation of a security regime? After concluding that none of Jervis' conditions for the formation of a security regime are met in the Southern African case, Brown argued that the prospects for a future security regime were bleak because the South African government understands that military aggression and regional destabilization work as a means of maintaining its national security. Furthermore, South Africa can be identified as a "revolutionary power" (cf. Nye 1987, p.377) driven by the ideology of apartheid, which defines the mere existence of anti-apartheid states as a threat--thus precluding regime formation. Third, what actions can be taken by third parties to resolve conflict? Since the root to Southern African conflict is apartheid, resolution must begin by changing South African domestic politics. This constitutes the logic for sanctions and other coercive measures against South Africa as a means of conflict resolution. It was added that support for the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) states can act as a stop-gap measure to aid in mitigating the impact of South Africa's policy of regional destabilization.

South Africa

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As a preface to his presentation, Mr. O'Meara agreed with Professor Brown that a security regime is neither possible nor desirable in Southern Africa. However, he disputed Brown's contention that South Africa is not interested in overthrowing