

with the benefit of the best technical advice and in the light of the views expressed by the individual countries or countries involved, the form and extent of the particular safeguards which are in fact relevant. In other words, the Board will conclude agreements with one or more individual countries in connection with all projects in which it participates or provides safeguards, and the Board will have authority to include in those agreements provision for such safeguards as it is permitted under the statute to apply and as it decides to be relevant to the particular project. It is important that in the statute we should assign sufficient permissive authority to the Board to ensure that it has adequate powers to deal properly with any such case that may arise, but this authority is only permissive and the extent to which it will be exercised in any individual project must be determined by the Board in relation to that project.

The actual permissive authority assigned in this Article in effect provides for control and inspection by the Agency sufficient to ensure that the fissionable materials involved in any project in which the Agency is a participant shall be so accounted for that there is no reasonable likelihood that they could be diverted to purposes other than those declared. This, it seems to us, is the essential feature of the control article. Unless this feature is retained no country can have real confidence in the efficacy of Agency controls. Obviously this means in the first place that what are called special fissionable materials must be subject to control at all times. In referring to special fissionable materials I have in mind those materials enriched in their fissionable content so that in some forms and in some degrees of enrichment they might be directly utilized in connection with the production of weapons. The provisions of the Article also mean that there must be sufficient accounting for source materials used in a project to ensure that the special fissionable materials which may be produced from them can at all times be controlled in the same way. Finally, the article provides that the fissionable products of projects in which the Agency participates, even though the raw fuels involved may not be supplied through the Agency, shall be similarly controlled.

The Agency is also authorized in the Article to require that fissionable products recovered from such projects shall not only be subjected to accounting and control but shall be deposited with the Agency, except where retention for specified non-military use is authorized. My Government believes that this provision is essential if the control of such materials is to be effective. I should make very clear, however, the limitations upon the control which we envisage in connection with such fissionable products. We believe that such products must be regarded as the property of the country from whose project they were derived, even though they are deposited with the Agency for storage. That country alone should be able to determine whether they will be retained in storage for its own future use or whether they should be available for disposition through the Agency to assist programmes in other countries. The Agency should have authority to approve or disapprove the release of such product fissionable materials to the country involved in order to ensure that they will not be used in projects involving risks either to health and safety or of diversion to military use, but the Agency should have no authority to withhold or delay the release of these materials to the country of origin on any other ground. If, in the opinion of the Conference, the existing draft is insufficiently precise on this point, the Canadian delegation, for its part, would be prepared to support an addition to sub-paragraph 5 of paragraph A of Article XIII in the following terms: