

me more diligent in cultivating, my crops would be improved. And so I have several sons, and I prefer not to have their minds filled not only with doubts, but doubts specially shaped and intended to shake their confidence in truths which I hold to be dearer than life. Thought must be free, and doubts will come, and honest doubters have a right to tell their doubts, but for a man of the Ingersoll type trading in doubt, I would encourage him just as much as I would a man who would make a trade of sowing thistles, &c., in gardens. He may be a benefactor to the community—as per Greeley's view—but when he comes my way, at least, I prefer to use all proper means to restrain him.

Free Thought.

GOD AND NATURE.

A CRITICISM OF A RECENT ARTICLE IN THE "NINETEENTH CENTURY" MAGAZINE.

The need of this age we live in is emphatically not an apology for religion framed so as to pacify science. Still less is it an entire separation of science from religion. And yet a compound of these two ingredients is offered by the Right Rev. Lord Bishop of Carlisle in his treatise on "God and Nature" in the March number of the *Nineteenth Century* magazine. The intelligent human society of to-day craves "bread" to sustain and help forward by higher, richer life material progress, and the Right Rev. Lord Bishop offers it a "stone" of falsity which must prove itself such in practice. The hunger of society can be satisfied only with a complete union of religion, and science; and so men bring religion, the religion of a so-called orthodoxy, to the test of practical life in the daily path of experience. They thus judge it by its fitness to do good, or dismiss it because it is found useless. Science does not crave the negation of religion. It seeks rather to find in the knowledge of nature and nature's laws a religion of life.

But the Right Rev. Lord Bishop of Carlisle sets forth thus his apology alike for science and religion: "All physical science, properly so called, is compelled by its very nature to take no account of the being of God; as soon as it does this it trenches upon theology and ceases to be physical science." He goes on to assert that "the man who investigates the mechanics of the heavens finds a complicated system of motion, a number of bodies mutually attracting each other, and moving according to certain assumed laws." In working out the results of his assumed laws the mathematician has no reason to consider how the "bodies come to be as they are; that they are as they are is not only enough for him, but it would be utterly beyond his province to enquire how they came so to be." There are scientific men not a few, and men of average common sense in great numbers, who will take leave to doubt this proposition; for how can a man "assume" laws otherwise than in order to search out how the bodies and their motions "are as they are," and when the "assumed" law is found to square with the facts and becomes thus no longer an "assumption" but a reality, the enquirer must of necessity seek next the reason for, and quality of, that law so as to be able to judge of the beneficence or evil of that which is behind it giving it life and being. His investigations compel further enquiry at every step of correctly ascertained progress.

Entirely oblivious to any such reasoning, our author goes on to state "God and nature are very close the one to the other; the nature of nature, and the natures of things natural, must necessarily be contiguous. We need a scientific position between them, a line which shall on no condition be transgressed by those who occupy the territory on one side or the other. The necessity of keeping this frontier line sacred is perhaps not sufficiently recognized, and there is a great tendency to transgress it." Such a separation, he says, is one "which no human arrangement can alter. If on the one side is God, and on the other nature, this means that on the one side you have a moral and religious region and on the other a purely physical region."

Such is the Right Rev. gentleman's position, and from it he does not swerve. It is merely charitable to conclude that he fails fully to perceive what such an entire separation of the universe of morals from the universe of matter implies. The natural and inevitable corollary is that the Creator no longer lives in His creation, but has left it to take care of itself; that He no longer either supports, animates, or recreates it by continuing the force and guidance of His laws; so that we can study His works and yet find nothing of the mind of the Creator perceptible in them. They speak to us only of dead matter, void of force, re-creative energy or action. Yet this is simply untrue, "the heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament showeth His handiwork." Rising a step higher, on the basis of the former hypothesis formulated by my Lord Bishop, we find the conclusions thrust upon us that man, a creator also in his finite way by his finite will, intellect, and works, can divorce himself also from what he makes or has made. What he may will or think is a separate thing altogether and need not necessarily show itself at all in his actions. The moral part of man therefore may be, and is, by the Bishop's theory, entirely separate from the physical. A man may have moral longings which fill him with kindness and good wishes towards all his fellows, and yet the physical man may occupy its powers in dealing destruction to all other powers of physical life. It is not clearly defined by the Bishop that there is any

separation or "scientific frontier" between morals and religion, but it is implied. Therefore it would follow that a man may be highly religious in a sublimated kind of way, without showing the slightest trace of it either in his moral condition or physical conduct. Is not this the doctrine of "faith" separate from "works" carried to a depth which ultimates in *reductio ad absurdum*? Is it not indeed physical death—a body without any animating soul?

It is then surely as impossible to separate either or both from physical action or efforts. Religion, science, and usefulness, are to each other as end, cause, and effect. There can be no effect without its cause, and there can be no cause which has not its end or prior cause. To trace cause after cause for countless ages is, after all, to find *some* eternal cause or end. An end, or first cause, somewhere, is the natural demand of a rational sanity. The end, cause and effect in man are his will, intellect and action. The correspondence of these, exactly adapted to the reception of each, are religion, science, and the experience by the senses of the material objects surrounding us. Yet precisely as will, intellect, and action constitute a man, so religion, science and work find their effect in a life. It depends however on the quality and direction of the "end," or will, whether the causes or "intellect" works its "effect" in an action which shall be useful or otherwise; and so there may be a religion which is good or a religion which is evil, a science which is true or false, and physical conduct resultant beneficently or destructively. It remains ever a truth susceptible of proof, if need be, in material things, that the will, using the intellect, always ultimates itself wholly, both as regards its desire and thought, in physical deeds. In so far as the whole of what constitutes the motive force finds its completion in acts, the entire nature, character, and quantity of the force put forth, remains concentered, or stored up, in the effect, and can be discerned in it. For example, take the commonest article of furniture, a chair. In it we can read the character of the man who made it. The man is known by his works. The very material employed shows whether beauty, comfort or usefulness was the aim or will of the maker. Years after the workman has left the sphere of his material labours we can know by the manner in which his work has been done, the scientific and religious force employed to do it, can read as in an open book whether the knowledge he used so framed by a love of usefulness to others, or whether he only strove after a knowledge that would fit him to make a mere semblance of usefulness whereby to gain a reward for self only. The man's inner conscience and consciousness remain within his work. There is an inner cause distinctly visible in every piece of furniture or clothing made by man the finite creator, no less distinctly traceable there than in every work of the Great Creator who framed, maintains and re-creates the universe.

There is, therefore, no real knowledge—no true science—unless the will to know be the very love of truth for the sake of usefulness, for the service of man or the service of God. These two uses are really one and the same, are indeed scarcely distinguishable. Such love and knowledge, ultimating in useful action, are religion. Its opposite; the will to know, the love of knowledge, to distinguish, elevate or serve self; is that religion? Can such a will attain or form truth? By "increasing knowledge" it can only "increase sorrow" to itself and others. Increase of knowledge of the mere appearances of things lays up in store continued deceptions and disappointments; for it finds the apparent truth it discovers to be only an appearance, and not a reality.

It may be accepted safely as an axiom that no science, no art, into which the love of self enters to guide and control, will ever become really science or really art. Nor is the axiom original. It is merely the application to nature of our Lord's words "he that doeth My will shall learn of the teaching." For His will is "to do good," not to self, but to others, His children and our brethren. His teaching, the expression of Himself in His divine word, or in His created worlds and the living creatures for whose use He has made them, can only be revealed to that man who shall will as He wills to be useful to others. So only can the clue to the unity of His work be found. There is no "scientific frontier" separating the moral from the material universe to the man who seeks knowledge of both or either for the sake of usefulness. The end held in view by such an one—that is, the will of him—prompts him to "assume" laws similar in aim of usefulness as animating the material things into whose inner cause he is searching. He thus comes into the line of vision, but from above, not from beneath, and so is enabled to see not only more at one glance, but with unfailing accuracy to discern the true intent of nature's laws and operations, and by experimental tests in nature to justify, by ultimating, his conclusions.

It is hard then to discern between the righteous and the wicked scientist—between him that serveth God and his fellow-man, and him that serveth no other but himself? "By their fruits ye shall know them" when for instances the pursuit of knowledge induces the infliction of untold tortures upon dumb animals by vivisection, and that shrine of life which can neither be restored nor created by man is violated, can such action spring from the love of usefulness? No true science can be so reached; for the very agonies so inflicted cause an abnormal condition of the life forces. All that can be thus traced is exceptional. The scientist cannot reason thence towards the conditions of a