

Sir R. H. Sheaffe did right in not bringing his men forward and exposing them to the fire of the shipping; they came forward at the proper time when the enemy had ceased firing for fear of killing their own men. If they failed, from the nature of the ground and the distance they had to march, in arriving in time, it was neither the fault of the troops nor the commander. I feel convinced that no *military* man will condemn Gen. Sheaffe for having placed a portion of his force to protect the only road by which the enemy would gain his rear; this was a necessary precaution never to be neglected. Some have ventured to predict that had the enemy been attacked after the explosion of the magazine, it would have proved an easy conquest. You might as well have expected to accomplish this by throwing your *own magazine* at their heads. You must recollect that it was necessary for the commander to place his own troops beyond the mark of the explosion, and, although you affirm the contrary, he did do so, and this caused a distance of nearly two miles to intervene between the two armies. It was rather an impossibility to ascertain at such a distance, that a panic had been caused, and quite impracticable to make a sudden attack before it had subsided. It strikes me very forcibly that our sadly crippled remaining force of some four or five hundred would have cut a very sorry figure had they attempted to make a rapid movement for *two miles* to attack an army of two thousand, long after they had had time to recover from their confusion.

Serjeant Marshall no doubt thought himself a very clever fellow, but I should like to be informed by *what rule* he intended to compute the time which Gen. Pike proposed to take in marching to the magazine. If he had made no halt, you admit in your account, that, the "port-fire" was just the right length. The truth is, the intention was to give our retreating troops time to avoid the danger, and to prevent the enemy getting the powder, leaving him to his chance of broken heads. However clumsily it may have been done, is nothing to the purpose, *that* was Sergeant Marshall's fault. The object was gained and as I happened to be with the rear guard, I am quite certain that none but stragglers could have been injured. You say that he appeared to have no "fixed plan." He could have had but one, and that was to oppose the landing. This he tried.—He did every thing which the circumstances admitted, and the means within his power enabled him to do. His troops fought and fought bravely; yet they were repulsed. Your own statement of the numbers engaged and the list of kil-

led and wounded on both sides sufficiently prove that our little band did all that men could do against such a superior force. There was no hope left—there was no fortification to retire into, no broken ground, no heights, no passes which could be defended, no expectation of reinforcements, no arms to place in the hands of the militia from the country had they come in.—What more *could have been done*? Had Gen. Sheaffe decided upon making another stand, no doubt the men would have fought bravely—another list of killed and wounded would have been added "to gild the bitter pill" of defeat, and satisfy John Bull's pugnacious idea of a never give up fight. But I ask "Cui bono?" The general is responsible for the lives of his men, and "foul fall him" who unnecessarily sacrifices the life of *one brave soldier* to pander to the *patriotic sentimentality* of those "Gentlemen who live at ease." Gen. Sheaffe was a brave and good man,—we do not find any *military* authority making a charge against him. Instead of being called to an account, he has been since rewarded by his Sovereign with a Regiment. He has had no opportunity of confuting the charges made by scribblers at home, or scribblers in Canada, during his lifetime. He died at a very advanced age, and to the last retained the esteem and respect of those who knew him best. I am not aware that there is one of the regular army in the country, who was present at the battle, to defend him, but myself, and I trust that in common justice to the dead, this letter, lengthy though it be, will find a place in your next issue.

I am, yours &c.,

TRUTH.

Cornwall, November, 1853.

ST. JOHN—NEW BRUNSWICK.

The province of New Brunswick was, until the close of 1782, merely a county of Nova Scotia, with but a few inhabitants, who, scattered here and there along the banks of the many adjacent streams which every where intersect the country, gained their subsistence by the products of their industry as fishermen or hunters.

In 1783, it became the home of many most respectable and influential families who had been in the British service, and who, on retirement, settled in the United States; but, in consequence of their attachment to British monarchy, were obliged to abandon the republican territory and seek an asylum under the British flag. In 1784, the first Governor, Honorable T. Carlton, entered on office and continued for two years to conduct