European Economic Commun beset by internal pressures hese er. Bi m, so

By Philip Windsor

When Britain finally became a member of the European Economic Community at the beginning of 1973, it appeared that many of the problems of creating "Europe" were now well on their way to solution. Britain, after all, had been a test case for the will and intention of Europe ever since the veto imposed upon its application by General de Gaulle some ten years earlier. The fact that Britain and France had now agreed on the terms of enlargement, that the other members had acceded, that all were prepared to accept the new complications of arriving at agreements and decisions in an enlarged Community, seemed to testify to an abundant political will.

At the same time, the enlargement meant that Europe had finally arrived as an economic super-power. The Community now accounted for 23 per cent of the world's gross national product (GNP). It was also responsible for more than half the foreign trade of the globe. But this measure of responsibility was not confined to the economic sphere. Europe already exercised very considerable political influence throughout the Mediterranean basin and over much of Africa. The pattern of association agreements that were being negotiated or signed between the members of the Community and other states seemed to testify to the growing vitality and the growing "thrust" of Europe in the affairs of the world. Indeed, Dr. Kissinger, at that time still an enthusiast for his own vision of a future world organized and run from five centres of power, was still inclined to see Western Europe as one of these. But not only did this reflect Dr. Kissinger's

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personal view of the future "peninging it also reflected an objective realityst rela

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At that time European cur were strong and the American dolects o weak. It was not unusual to see terms from the American Treasury amirging Brussels, cap in hand, to plead forn to f European understanding of the filbeen commercial and economic diffe pr caused by the war in Vietnam (in Ostpo the French answer was negative ed of German answer positive). In other begin Europe appeared to have acquirendt cr cisive voice in West-West relationds, it

But Europe's purpose appearalize to extend to relations between Emanie West. The Davignon Commitat wa effect, the foreign ministers merend regular congress - was expected ely no vide the framework for new initiorma relations with the Soviet Union wides states of Eastern Europe. This, bgren was an area that concerned Eur This closely. And, also at the beginning mique a new regulation had come inspille whereby commercial agreements im d member states of The Nine and wh foreign governments were now sub ns to the scrutiny of the Commission. (amin cial policy was, in fact, to becom doct only strument of foreign policy. ions

Frustration

In all these respects, Europe app^{dyna} be on the verge of "takeoff". And record since that time has been ble t frustration. This is not to suggission everything that The Nine have al. spe has ended in failure. In some Noth their achievements have been sing But the entity "Europe" can stil the be said to exist.

Does anyone now remember ha of only two or three years ago of pean identity"? Did it disappear with Pompidou? "Il faut faire was once the common slogan. Dot remember it now – does anyone d how or whether "Europe" is m frustrations of the intervening

Enlargement meant Europe had arrived as economic super-power