

this Bill this evening, and I am not willing to incur the denunciations of the hon. gentleman from Niagara, who might think, perhaps, I am becoming factious in my opposition and unnecessarily tedious in my remarks. So I will endeavor to draw them to a close. Some apprehension perhaps exists on the part of gentlemen who form the Opposition in and out of Parliament, that the tendency of this Bill is dangerous; that it is one which will place much parliamentary power at the disposal of the present Government, and thus maintain them permanently in office, and, I believe, there is danger of that; but I deduce another conclusion from it different from that which some people do. I draw conclusions rather favorable to the advancement of reform principles. I believe, myself, that the Government and their friends began to be aware of the certain advance of reform principles in the country; that they began to get rather fearful as to whether they would be able to maintain their position, and hence this Bill which has been kept hanging over Parliament and the country for three years, and now it is found that a crisis has arrived, and that action must be taken if they are to preserve their position. While hon. gentlemen are reduced to that last resource, I say go on and make your intentions known to the country, and you will find that your expectations will be disappointed; that the people see through and through your design and will defeat this—I was going to say illegitimate object: I do not think the term would be altogether inappropriate—this illegitimate object at the polls. I shall say a few words before I conclude respecting the farmer's son franchise. It seems to me that that franchise is not altogether so worthy of praise as some hon. gentlemen have thought. It contrasts very unfavorably with the position of farmers' sons in my own province, as regards their obtaining votes. There they obtained the vote without reference to the farm at all, and without reference to the father; but by this Bill as it stands, the farmer must qualify the son or sons, and if it is not of sufficient value, however competent the sons may be, they can not become qualified from that source. The man has labored on his father's farm all his life; he may become a very estimable

character in the community, but may have very little money, and if he has to look to the farm for qualifications he may, in many instances, look in vain. He may even be disappointed when he comes to obtain this expected franchise from the farm. It may turn out, on inquiry, that the farm was not of the value anticipated. It may be intrinsically of the value required, but the owner may not be in full possession of it. He may possibly have never paid for it, or it is encumbered, and although the sons be perfectly competent under this law to become voters, they are disappointed. This is a great objection to it. You make the enfranchisement of the farmer's sons depend on the value of the farm, whereas the enfranchisement of the sons should depend upon their own fitness for the position. So much has already been said upon the revising barrister clauses that I do not think it is necessary to go into it any further. I have a decided objection to the system. I always regret to see the direct actions of governments in affairs which can be managed in another way. It seems to me that if the Government had followed the English precedent, and allowed their revising barristers—if they were determined that they would have revising barristers—to be appointed by the judges of the Supreme Court in their respective provinces, they would then have carried with them the confidence of the people, and I think no reflection could then have been cast upon those gentlemen on the score of their appointment. Whether they are actually fit for the duty, whether they are altogether candid and fair or not, suspicion will always attach to them, and it is a very objectionable thing that suspicion should attach to any judge. An hon. gentleman on the other side of the House (Mr. Plumb), speaking upon this point, told us that there was an appeal against the judge, an appeal to Parliament; that a judge who misconducted himself could be removed on an appeal to Parliament. This is a very good, a very safe, a very wholesome regulation as regards a criminal or common law judge; but I venture to suggest that it is a very improper and unsuitable arrangement when it relates to the appointment of a political judge. Hon. gentlemen know perfectly well, and no one knows better than the Minister of Justice, that