

*Statements by Ministers*

Reykjavik as a unique opportunity for a major breakthrough in arms control and disarmament, and that major opportunity has been jeopardized. I know that as the Minister watched this scenario unfold he probably recalled the words of Shakespeare who said:

There is a tide in the affairs of men,  
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;  
Omitted, all the voyage of their life  
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.

I ask the Minister to do his part, to speak out to the United States, the Soviet Union and the world to ensure that that tide is recaptured in the interest of international peace and security.

**Hon. Edward Broadbent (Oshawa):** Mr. Speaker, I will begin my comments by agreeing with the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Clark) that the whole world was indeed watching what was taking place at Reykjavik on Thanksgiving weekend. It watched with a great deal of hope that the two superpowers might reach an agreement, not simply on limiting weapons of one kind or another but on serious reductions of weapons. That was the hope, not only of Canadians but of people throughout the planet.

[*Translation*]

The Secretary of State for External Affairs said that the superpowers have made progress. That is true. The Minister stressed that the two parties have agreed to put certain suggestions they discussed in Reykjavik on the table. They intend to continue their discussions, and I agree. We have seen progress at certain levels, but it is also true that the superpowers have lost an historic opportunity. I hope that this time, the loss will be only temporary, but the fact is there just the same.

[*English*]

They did lose what was almost within their grasp. It is with some sadness that the people of Canada and all the people of the world note this reality.

In this context we in this House have been rightly critical of the Soviet Union for many years, not only on internal arrangements about civil liberties, on which there is total agreement in this House, but in particular of the Soviet Union's reluctance to open itself to outside observers to ensure that agreements entered into were implemented. As I said, we have been rightly critical. Those of us who live in open societies have been trying to feel our way toward sensible proposals which could lead, not only to arms control but to disarmament. We have been critical of the Soviet's reluctance to open up.

● (1130)

A year ago last summer in Geneva I had occasion to have very serious discussions, back to back, with the principal Soviet negotiator Mr. Karpov on the one hand, and the principal American negotiator, Max Kampelman, on the other. Let me say, in the context of what took place at Reykjavik, that having had these conversations with these two key representatives of the two superpowers I certainly did not come away

with any high degree of optimism. It seemed to me a year ago last summer that both the Soviet Union and the United States were locked into positions that made it almost impossible for an agreement to be reached. Neither side seemed willing to make key concessions.

I wish the Secretary of State for External Affairs had been open on this point.

If one looks at what was agreed to at Reykjavik in terms of the shifting of positions, I think it is clear that the Soviet Union made the major moves. There were half a dozen key positions, including verification procedures, to which they rigidly held. We saw them shift ground as they needed to shift ground. It seems to me that when we in the House and throughout western democratic society see that kind of move taking place, particularly under new leadership in the Soviet Union, which may now be challenged as a result of some shifts that have been taken, we ought to give credit where credit is due. I see the Secretary of State nodding his head in agreement with that point.

There were moves on both sides, but the major moves were taken by the Soviet Union. I think we must carefully look for the stumbling block that led to the breakdown of what could have been an historic agreement. I believe the evidence is very clear, if we do not blind ourselves to it. The stumbling block, as I see it and which, frankly, as disinterested observers in Europe and indeed the United States and our country see it, was in fact President Reagan's insistence on the United States' right to go ahead with the development of testing of star wars during the next 10 years and the right to deploy such a system at the end of the decade. I use those words with care and say to the Secretary of State for External Affairs that such development, testing and deployment are in clear violation of Article V of the ABM Treaty.

I would have liked the Secretary of State for External Affairs to say that clearly in the House today. It is very important for us to understand as a nation, and very important for the world to understand that the stumbling block to reaching an agreement in terms of all the documents that have emerged and statements that have been made has been the United States' insistence in these discussions on its right to break the existing ABM Treaty. I believe that is the unvarnished reality.

The spokesperson for the Liberal Party has read Article V so I will not repeat it. However, not only is the U.S. proposal a violation of Article V, it is important to note that by pursuing this course of action at Reykjavik the United States in fact reversed Secretary of State Shultz's commitment to a "restrictive interpretation" of the treaty which is very precise in prohibiting testing and development of the star wars system.

In this context let me say that the Secretary of State for External Affairs himself cited Mr. Shultz on this point in the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence on December 4, 1985. He cited with approval Mr. Shultz's restrictive interpretation definition of the ABM