the whole of Georges Bank, extended, of course, to the "adjusted perpendicular line" in an effort to provide it with additional tactical protection on the perimeter. For the United States, the non-division of Georges Bank becomes an equitable principle in its own right, clothed in the theories of the "natural boundary" and "single-state management". The measure of equity becomes the length of Georges Bank, as the length of the Lord Chancellor's foot became the measure of eguity when the then separate systems of equity and law drew too far apart in England.

Neither equity nor law provides a basis for such an extraordinary view of equitable principles. The theory of a natural boundary defining and dividing both the continental shelf and the exlusive economic zone does not fit within the legal framework of either concept. The duty to conserve resourses and the duty to avoid disputes are duties that apply to all neighbouring states. They limit the exercise of a State's rights. But they have nothing to do with the delimitation of the area in which these rights may be exercised. Otherwise, Mr, President, things would really be too easy for the party claiming the whole pie. That party, in effect, would be given a ready-made recipe for a monopolistic claim.

Mr. President, the United States' claim to the whole of Georges Bank also relies upon a theory of "complete dominance" over the Gulf of Maine area, constructed on the basis of state activities in no way related to the history of the dispute. The notion of dominance, however, has nothing to do with the legal regime of the Continental Shelf. It was categorically rejected in the development of the concept of the exclusive economic zone. More important still, it is repugnant to the very idea of equity. "Equality is equity", says the English Maxim (Richard Francis, Maxims of Eguity, 1728), and international law adds only that equality must be reckoned within the same place and must not imply any refashioning of geography (I.C.J. Reports, 1969, paragraph 91).

But, Mr. President, the notion of dominance is implicit even in the United States' view of geography, and the refashioning of geography is precisely what follows from the United States' doctrine of primary and secondary coasts. For the Unites States gives the coast of Maine a dominant character because it is allegedly a "primary" coast. And the coast of Nova Scotia must yield to this dominance because it is allegedly a "secondary" coast. Despite the most careful reading of the United States' pleadings, we must say that we cannot understand the reasons for this unusual proposition, nor find any legal authority advanced in its support.