macroeconomic externalities upon another depends on the relative size of the nations.[11] As a result, large nations would be less likely to honour their commitments.

Although Britain and Canada received the highest scores, and the United States the second lowest, the scores do not reveal any *systematic pattern* based on economic size. Likewise, there is no *significant correlation* of compliance scores with the relative size of the economy, as measured by its GDP. Therefore, the evidence does not support the hypothesized relationship between a country's relative capabilities and its overall compliance score.

The empirical findings by Kokotsis, and Kokotsis and Kirton, indicate, however, considerable support for the explanatory salience of institutional variables, the role of regimes, and the political control exercised by leaders in accounting for compliance behaviour.

A. Institutional Variables and Regimes

Institutional variables and the role of regimes point to explanations regarding Summit compliance. The findings on the debt side and assistance to Russia indicate that there has been a sustained, and in fact high level of Summit compliance by both Canada and the US in these issue areas during the 1989-1995 Summit cycle. This reflects the important national institutional variables at work. Within both of these issue areas, the implementation of Summit resolutions occurs through long-established departments (Treasury and Finance) possessing well-defined domestic implementation responsibilities, but also manifesting strong institutional links to powerful multilateral organizations.

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[11] See, Dobson, Wendy. *Economic Policy Coordination: Requiem or Prologue?* Policy Analyses in International Economics, Vol. 30. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1991.