reports for inclusion in the International Register of Arms Transfers, a Canadian sponsored UN confidence-building initiative.

4.7 Encourage Adherence to and Renewal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Latin American resistance to NPT signature has rested on two pillars: satisfaction with the Treaty of Tlaltelolco and rejection of the NPT as a "discriminatory" document. Recent indications suggest that Argentina may be moving to signing the NPT, but only in concert with Brazil. Should this occur, and it is a decision that Canada should continue to encourage, it would open the way for adhesion by Chile. Over the next year before the 1995 NPT Review Conference, it will be crucial to encourage Argentina's adhesion. It will also be essential to ensure that Brazil follows the lead of Argentina. The fact that Brazil has entered into a cooperative economic arrangement with Argentina and that both have a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency may be signs that Brazilian national sovereignty concerns vis-à-vis the NPT have receded. In any event, Canada should undertake an active dialogue with the Southern Cone nations on this matter. At the same time, attention should also be focussed on Cuba.

4.8 Reintegration of Cuba: Fostering Peaceful Transition

Cuba poses a special dilemma for Canadian foreign policy that we should address carefully. Canada has maintained good relations with Cuba, especially with respect to trade, since the imposition of the U.S. embargo and the severing of diplomatic relations between Havana and Washington more than thirty years ago. The past may, however, be of limited use as a guide to the future. Although some economic reforms have been initiated in recent years in response to the end of Soviet support, the Castro government has shown less interest in introducing meaningful political changes and the regime's human rights record continues to give cause for concern. Rigidities exist that will complicate the transition, especially in the revanchist Cuban-American community and among American officials and politicians who feel vindicated for having kept the U.S. on an anti-Castro course.

It is clear, however, that regional interests will not be served should the transition to post-Castro Cuba turn violent. There are options open to Canada which would enable us to enhance the scope and quality of our relations with the present government, to protect and expand our interests now and in the future and to position ourselves to play an appropriate role in the transition itself. We should not shy away from being a player in the unfolding drama, given our presence in both Washington and Havana and our membership in the OAS.

Policy Staff Page 21