

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

participating in the negotiations in the CD, and fully aware of the advanced stage of the negotiations, develop and adopt plans for CW production, cannot but give rise to grave concern. It can be justified from neither the political nor the practical point of view. One cannot help wondering about the real policy of those States -- are they committed to a convention, or do they seek a CW build-up?

The Soviet Union attaches primary importance to questions of verification of compliance with disarmament agreements. At a time when real disarmament measures are under way, verification becomes one of the major means of ensuring security, as Comrade Chnoupek rightly pointed out in his statement today.

We note with satisfaction that our initiatives on verification, along with other countries' proposals, have made it possible to remove many obstacles to the elaboration of a mutually acceptable system of verifying compliance with the convention. These Soviet initiatives took into account the concerns of our partners in the negotiations, including the United States and other Western countries. In so doing we, among other things, wanted to dispel the mistrust on the part of the West, to invite its representatives to an open and honest dialogue on effective international verification. We note the positive ideas on a number of aspects of a future verification system expressed by the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Indonesia and other countries.

The problem of challenge inspections is now the central political problem in the negotiations on a CW ban. It runs through the entire convention and without a solution to this problem it is difficult to envisage a finalization of many of the convention's provisions.

We note with satisfaction that discussions of a ban on chemical weapons with the United Kingdom during the recent visit to Moscow by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher revealed that the positions of the two sides are close, and even coincide on some aspects, including challenge inspections. The British proposal, contained in document CD/715, is a basis for reaching compromise solutions and we believe maximum use should be made of it as a basis for an agreement.

In our view, the central point in the British proposal is the idea of the possibility of proposing alternative measures. This approach, we believe, will impart the necessary flexibility to the whole system of challenge inspections, and at the same time meets the general concern that challenge inspections should be an effective means of preventing and detecting breaches of the convention's provisions.

We have noted that in the 7 April statement of the United States delegation it was announced that the United States no longer objects to