

To say these things and not to make one's bow to the tensions within these societies and to the injustices to which they have been subjected and not to make one's bow to the Brandt Commission's proposals on North/South Relations is to stand accused of fitting everything in the world into an East/West conflict context. It is actually rather curious that the Reagan Administration, which is supposed to be the epitome of this, steadfastly refused to do so when the American media desperately tried to do it in the Falkland's War and in the Chad war and even in the case of the Israeli operations in Lebanon. But, in any event, if we are going to talk about the international security environment, it is very hard not to fit a lot of things into the problem of the central power balance in the world and that central power balance is essentially the power balance that exists between the East and West and between the Soviet Union and the United States, and it is on this issue that public attitudes in our countries, this one, ours and in Western Europe, have become sceptical and often uncomprehending. That, it seems to me, is one of the major changes despite the convulsions in the United States in 1970.

Now you wanted to talk about the directions that the security environment is likely to be evolve in the next fifteen years. I'll be very brief. Soviet military power is going to continue to grow, even if the annual expenditure rate increases at only two or three percent in real terms, as the CIA and others seem to think at the moment is the case. That still doubles it, unless Mr. Andropov or probably the next Soviet leader that will follow him decides otherwise. Brezhnev managed to double it in the eighteen years that he was there. What that means is that the