

Nor will it be sufficient to announce that at the official level the management of the relationship is smoother and irritants are more easily resolved. The public must be able to see some positive payoff, and that payoff must be actual and immediate, and not merely potential. There are two obvious prospects for this crucial result. The first would be a firm agreement on the reduction of acid rain. The two acid rain envoys, William Davis and Drew Lewis, were charged at the Quebec City summit to report back by March 1986. If they recommend, and both governments accept, a dramatic program of action on the acid rain problem rather than further study, there would be a tangible result by which to judge the gamble a success. Anything less, and the Canadian public would be understandably disillusioned.

The second possible payoff would be the inclusion of a new trade agreement with the United States. Whether such an agreement involved comprehensive free trade, sectoral free trade, or the creation of some new trade mechanism, it would have to involve more than merely the preservation of the status quo, no matter how valuable or beleaguered that status quo might be. It would have to offer greater access to the United States market than is now enjoyed, or in the current Mulroney vocabulary, "trade enhancement." Anything less would not in the public view be commensurate with the risks being run. Of course the time frame may be too short to permit such a trade agreement to reach a final conclusion by mid-1986, but substantial progress would have to be seen to have been achieved. Even if Congressional approval of any treaty or implementing legislation had not yet been obtained, the US administration would have to be visibly receptive and in agreement, without engaging in a prolonged negotiation to exact maximum advantage.

Don't take advantage

Third, even if disaster is avoided, and some positive economic benefit is achieved, for the gamble to be judged a success the public must be confident that there has been no compromising of Canadian sovereignty and independence in the face of US pressure. There must be no instances of US pressure on Canada to comply with its wishes (e.g., Central America) regardless of Canada's interests. Here symbolism will be very important. Any incident like the voyage of the *Polar Sea* through the Northwest Passage could escalate into an apparent challenge to Canadian sovereignty. Canadians are astute enough to realize that an independent foreign policy does not necessarily mean a different foreign policy. But for the gamble to be judged a success, they will insist that Canadian foreign policy decisions be taken for Canadian purposes, and not to follow a US lead, or because the closer relationship with the United States has left Canada with no room for maneuver.

There are also three criteria by which the gamble could be judged a failure. *First*, it will have failed if the bilateral relationship does get worse despite the actions of the Canadian government. If there is a trade war, a tariff surcharge on Canadian exports, or major protectionist legislation in the United States, the gamble will have been lost. *Second*, even if things do not get worse, it will have failed if the relationship stays the same, or manifests only marginal improvement. The public could not easily be

persuaded that this steady state outcome could not have been achieved without the unprecedented actions of the Mulroney government. *Third*, it will have failed if the Canadian government is seen by its citizens to have subordinated Canada's interests to US goals, and compromised Canada's sovereignty and independence.

This examination of the criteria for success and failure makes it clear that for the gamble to succeed, two necessary conditions must be met. The *first* is that the Mulroney government must clarify what its objectives are. The United States government will not force upon Canada a major acid rain cleanup program, or decide for Canada which among a variety of trade options is most in Canada's interests. The Canadian government must make plain to the United States what it wants, and to do that it must first decide what it wants. The time for public consultations on some of these issues is past. To take a public stand is to risk failure, but is also a necessary precondition for success and leadership.

Preparing for success

The *second* necessary condition is American compliance and restraint. The United States administration must substantiate the rhetoric of close relations, and must offer support for the kinds of initiatives which would embody success. The administration must also refrain from pressing its case too vigorously in an adversarial negotiation. The Reagan administration may be accustomed to playing hardball with Congress, with the Soviet Union or with other allies. That would be inappropriate in the closer Canada-United States relationship. This does not mean that the United States government should sacrifice its own interests, but it does mean that the emphasis should be on long term mutual benefit rather than short term unilateral advantage. For its part, the United States Congress should refrain from domestically-appealing but bilaterally-alarming rhetoric, and must not enact the kind of protectionist legislation which would signal failure of the gamble; in the present economic circumstances, that may be the most difficult condition to attain.

Mulroney's gamble — and ours

If the gamble succeeds, Brian Mulroney will be politically triumphant, the closest ally and most important trading partner of the United States will be even more closely associated, and Canada's role and self-image will have been irrevocably altered. Even under the best of conditions, as a partner rather than a subordinate, Canada will have identified itself with the United States, and been so identified by others. Certain options will have been foreclosed, and Canada will be proceeding down a track in tandem, benefitting or suffering economically and politically in synchronization with the United States to a greater extent than at present. Inevitably, Canada-US relations will loom even larger on Canada's policy agenda than before, and the public debate will continue to be preoccupied with the balance between costs and benefits of closer association with the United States.

If the gamble fails, Brian Mulroney will have been unable to produce positive results on his highest priority in foreign policy. His political future will be clouded, as will that of his party. More important, not only will his govern-