

Indonesian Parliament session at Malang. Two days later he addressed a letter to the Commission-General, reaffirming the Indonesian Delegation's inability to accept the so-called "Jonkman interpretation," but suggesting that they should compromise by signing the Langgadjadi Agreement first and discussing M. Jonkman's statements afterwards. Mr. Sjarir stated that on his side there was no objection to the Netherlands Government considering themselves bound by their own interpretation of the Agreement, but that he and his Cabinet were not prepared to accept these statements and explanations as binding on them. Two days later the Commission-General notified Mr. Sjarir that the Netherlands Government had authorised them to sign the Agreement on the basis of the suggested compromise.

Meanwhile, however, late on the night of the 16th March, Dr. van Mook quite suddenly informed Mr. Sjarir by letter that, to his sincere regret, it was considered necessary that Netherlands military units should occupy the inundated territory within the Republican perimeter in order to check further flooding of the Sourabaya area. (Netherlands forces had recently advanced 15 kilometres beyond the demarcation lines to occupy the important hydro-electric power station at Kratjak, justifying their action on the ground that it had been left unguarded by the Indonesians). At dawn the following day the territory in question was duly occupied—The Netherlands Army Information Service reporting that the sluices were secured intact, thus completely safeguarding the key position for the water supply of the Porong Delta. (This move by the Dutch military authorities gave the impression of being part of a deliberate plan to establish a firm foothold in the Krian-Porong triangle before pushing on, eventually, to the occupation of Modjokerto.) In their official communication notifying Mr. Sjarir of the *fait accompli*, the Commission-General also informed him that the state of the floods necessitated a greater area than the actual delta being covered in the operation and that they had also occupied Modjokerto. (Modjokerto is an important railway junction some 35 miles south of Sourabaya.) In this connexion it is of some interest to note that the only remaining hydro-electric station in West Java which is not held by the Dutch is that at Oeroeg, three kilometres from Tjibadak in the Buitenzorg area. On the day of the occupation of Modjokerto the local Netherlands Commander at Buitenzorg notified the Indonesian Commander that unless the

headman of a village in Republican control was handed over within a time-limit of three days, Dutch military forces would proceed to occupy Tjibadak. The Republican Commander complied with the demand before the ultimatum expired.

It can have provided little consolation to the Indonesians that both Dr. van Mook and the Commission-General wrote to M. Sjarir expressing their regret for the Porong Delta action, promising to limit it to the prevention of improper manipulation of the sluices and stressing their hope that no delay might be occasioned thereby to the signing of the Linggadjadi Agreement. Mr. Sjarir lodged a formal protest, made it clear that he was not prepared to sign before he had investigated the situation at Modjokerto and discussed the whole question with Dr. Soekarno and other members of his Cabinet, and left immediately for Jogjakarta.

On the 22nd March a full meeting of the Indonesian Government took place and on the following day the Republican Ministry of Information announced that, in accordance with the decision taken by the K.N.I.P. at the session recently held at Malang, the Indonesian Delegation would sign the draft Agreement in its original form and at the same time would press for a solution of the several breaches of the "truce" committed by the Netherlands forces. Reports from Dutch sources also claim that an amicable compromise has been reached on the Modjokerto problem, but, if this is so, its terms are not yet known.

In the meantime the Hague decision to authorise acceptance of the "face-saving" loop-hole provided in Mr. Sjarir's letter has resulted in the resignation of one member of the Commission-General, M. de Boer, and of both its two recently appointed Advisors, Professors Posthuma and Verzijl. No reasons for these resignations have been stated officially yet, but newspaper comment describes M. de Boer's action as a protest against the manner in which the Indonesian question has been conducted at the Hague since the draft Agreement was initialled in November, 1946, and to irritation over the delay resulting from the motion sponsored by, and the recent speech-making activities in Java of, Professor Romme. Reports from Indonesian quarters express appreciation of M. de Boer's understanding of the situation and sound a note of genuine regret at his withdrawal. Just the opposite reason is said to have prompted the resignations of Professors Posthuma and Verzijl. They are recorded as holding the opinion that

the Netherlands Government's decision to authorise the Agreement to be signed on the basis of Mr. Sjarir's letter is incompatible with the motion of Professor Romme and Jonkheer van de Goes van Naters which was adopted at the Hague as the condition of acceptance of the draft Agreement (see *Summary* No. 381), and on which understanding they had taken up their appointments to advisorships.

Originally it had been intended by the Republican Government that Mr. Sjarir

should head the Indonesian Delegation to the Inter-Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi (see *Summary* No. 383), but it was finally decided that the recent political events rendered this inadvisable and, for the same reason, it was also considered better not to adopt the suggestion that Vice-President Hatta should go in his place. Finally M. Haji Agoes Salim, the Republican Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, headed the Delegation, which was scheduled to leave Java on the 20th March.

#### THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Truman's request for 400 million dollars in aid to Greece and Turkey continues to preoccupy the press and the leaders of Congress in the United States. A bill to meet the President's requirements was introduced by Representative Charles A. Eaton, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on the 18th March. It provides for amounts not exceeding 100 million dollars to be advanced by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation until such time as the total appropriation of 400 million has been approved by Congress. It authorizes the President to send a limited number of military and civilian experts to Greece and Turkey in an advisory capacity and to transfer to those countries such goods, services and information and to extend to them such "instruction and training of personnel" as he may deem advisable. Representatives of the American press and radio are to be permitted to "observe freely and report fully regarding the utilization of such assistance," and the President is to make quarterly reports to Congress on all the "expenditures and activities" involved.

Hearings on Mr. Eaton's bill opened in the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the 20th March and in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 24th March. On the 20th Mr. Dean Acheson read to the House Committee a prepared statement on the developments in Greece and Turkey which had led to the appeal for assistance and on the considerations which made it imperative for the United States Government to take the action proposed. Mr. Eaton is striving to get his bill through the House in the shortest possible time. On the 19th his Committee reported out favourably the 350 million dollars general relief bill (see *Summary* No. 383), thereby preparing the way for consideration of the new measure. The Senate likewise is en-

deavouring to clear its calendar for the coming debate on the foreign relief programme. The general impatience among Senate leaders to increase the pace of proceedings led on the 18th March to a clash between the Republican President *pro tempore*, Senator Vandenberg, and the ranking Democratic member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Connally. Senator Connally felt that, after the precedents established by the loans to Great Britain, France and Italy, the Senate could proceed with its debate on the plans with regard to Greece and Turkey without waiting for the answers to the questionnaire which Senator Vandenberg had invited his colleagues to submit to the State Department. There was also an uneasy moment on the same day when Senator Vandenberg stepped down from the rostrum to denounce a proposal by Mr. Gael Sullivan, the executive director of the Democratic National Committee and Assistant Postmaster-General, that the chairman of the rival Republican National Committee should subscribe to a joint proclamation in support of President Truman's policy. Senator Vandenberg asserted that when bi-partisan policy got into the hands of national committees it was "in grave danger of losing its precious character," which derived from the fact that it was "not the result of political coercion but of non-political conviction." He also took the occasion to remind Mr. Sullivan that the present bi-partisan approach did not extend to "China policies or Pan-American policies," with both of which he had at times been dissatisfied.

There is still much concern at the possible effect which the proposed direct action with regard to Greece and Turkey may have upon the prestige of the United Nations. Mr. Acheson endeavoured to dispel anxiety on this score in his statement of the 20th March when, after pointing out