

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Extrait de Forum Memo – juin 1960*

*Extract from Forum Memo – June 1960*

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS PREFER  
U.S. BILATERAL EXTENSIONS

Of eleven countries which have research bilateral agreements with the U.S. expiring in 1960, only one, Lebanon, has so far agreed to the U.S. suggestion that in lieu of extending the agreement, the facilities and services of the IAEA be used as the means for peaceful atomic energy co-operation with the U.S.

Seven other nations — Argentina, Brazil, Philippines, China, Greece, Israel, and Portugal — have indicated preference for the bilateral route, and short term extensions to the existing bilaterals (in most cases for two years) have been negotiated with these governments. Discussions are still in progress with Pakistan, Chile, and Colombia.

AEC Policy: The AEC, which has been criticized on occasion for continuing the bilaterals in view of the availability of IAEA channels of co-operation, outlined its current position as follows:

“The U.S. is pursuing a policy of discussing with nations whose bilaterals expire in 1960 the possibility of their channelling future requests for assistance and administration of safeguards through the IAEA. If the country involved does not wish to do this, the U.S. proceeds to negotiate a short term extension and updating of the present agreement.”

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DEA/14001-2-6-40

*Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
pour le premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa], June 28, 1960

PROPOSED APPROACH TO PRIME MINISTER NEHRU  
REGARDING THE ATTITUDE OF INDIA TOWARDS  
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SAFEGUARDS

At its General Conference opening on September 22, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will discuss the proposed system of safeguards to ensure that nuclear materials supplied for peaceful purposes are not diverted to military use. As you are aware, India (supported by the Soviet bloc) has consistently opposed the proposed Agency safeguards on the grounds that they would be a derogation of national sovereignty and would moreover constitute discrimination against the “under-developed” countries, which do not maintain nuclear military programmes.

The establishment of a multilaterally agreed and administered system of safeguards has from the beginning been the principal goal of the IAEA. Since its purpose is to impede the accumulation by any country of sufficient fissionable material to launch a nuclear weapons programme, it must be looked upon as an important ancillary mechanism in the system of controlled disarmament which Canada wishes to see emerge from international discussion, regardless of the forum that may be chosen for it. Another consideration, important from the internal Canadian point of view, is that any further delay in procuring the general adoption of a