

would press for the former and it might be difficult and perhaps even unwise to avoid talking about these critical Mediterranean problems.

2. Dulles agreed that there should be full opportunity for serious political discussion in Paris and in advance of the meetings joint consideration should be given to the subjects to be dealt with and the manner in which they should be discussed. Incidentally you may remember that he thought Cyprus was within the NATO area.

[A.D.P.] HEENEY

9. DEA/50000-A-40

*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Ambassador in United States
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 615

Washington, March 29, 1956

SECRET. IMPORTANT.

Reference: Our tel 611 Mar 29/56.

YOUR TALKS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AFTER WHITE SULPHUR
SPRINGS: ARMS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST⁸

You referred at White Sulphur Springs to the danger of the Israeli Government concluding that the balance of arms was shifting rapidly against them unless they were able to obtain some of their requirements. It was for this reason that the Canadian Government had already authorized some shipments and were considering something more. Israeli authorities were particularly anxious to obtain from us F-86 fighters.

2. Dulles, who had told us he had been conferring with the President before dinner on the Middle East situation, said that the US Government felt that if they acceded in full to Israeli requests for arms, they would lose their ability to restrain the Arab States. On the other hand they were contemplating releasing in the near future some clearly defensive item (he mentioned antisubmarine mines as a possibility) and he did not see the same objection to other governments, for example Canada, authorizing the transfer of other weapons which Israel needed urgently. He thought that such action would go some distance to relieving Israeli apprehensions of the nature you had described. (Incidentally, Dulles said that perhaps Nasser would soon "have to be cut down to size").

3. It seemed evident to me that what Dulles meant was that the US Government would raise no objection if we decided, for example, to sell a squadron of F-86's to the Israelis and if other countries were disposed to take similar action. (Eban is coming to see me this afternoon. I understand on good authority that in his talk yesterday with Dulles he was told that the US Government would give "the green light" to other countries although they could not do much themselves). Presumably we would have to take great care before deciding upon a course which might be represented as pulling United States chestnuts out of the fire.

[A.D.P.] HEENEY

⁸ Voir volume 22, chapitre premier, première partie, section (b).

See Volume 22, Chapter I, Part I, Section (b).