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That the patronage of the government in England has been advised and used for party purposes—especially before the era of administrative and parliamentary reform—there is no doubt. Those were the days of Executive corruption, and not of "equal justice" in the administration of the government. They are beacons of warning, not examples for imitation. The principle was always condemned both by statesmen and moralists—the same as profane swearing—even by those who were guilty of it; and the fact itself of such abuse of patronage was denied, except in cases where it was too shamelessly notorious to admit of denial. One minister of the British crown did indeed unblushingly avow the doctrine itself; but his name, in connection with his celebrated maxim (the essence of the doctrine of the late councillors,) that "every man has his price," is only remembered to be detested. Dr. Paley, in his *Moral and Political Philosophy*, even ranks appointments to office according to qualifications amongst the *rights of the subject*. (Chap. X.) He says, "Rights are perfect or imperfect. Perfect rights may be asserted by force, or, what in civil society comes in the place of private force, by course of law." In giving examples of "imperfect rights," he says, "appointments to office; where the qualifications are prescribed, the best qualified candidate has a right to success; yet if he be rejected, he has no remedy. He cannot seize the office by force, or obtain redress at law; his right is therefore imperfect. Wherever the right is imperfect, the corresponding obligation is so too. I am obliged to prefer the best candidate, to relieve the poor, be grateful to my benefactors, take care of my children, and reverence my parents; but in all these cases, my obligation, like their right is imperfect. I call these obligations 'imperfect,' in conformity to the established language of writers on the subject. The term, however, seems ill chosen on this account, that it leads many to imagine, that there is less guilt in the violation of an imperfect obligation, than of a perfect one; which is a groundless notion. For an obligation being perfect or imperfect, determines only whether violence may or may not be employed to enforce it. Paley adds that a man who by partiality, 'disappoints a worthy candidate of a station in life, upon which his hopes, possibly, or livelihood, depended, and who thereby grievously discourages merit and emulation in others, commits I am persuaded a much greater crime, than if he had filched a book out of a library, or picked a pocket of a handkerchief; though in the one case he violates an imperfect right, in the other a perfect one.'

In this reasoning, it will be seen that candidates for offices have a right in proportion to their qualifications and merits, and that a corresponding obligation rests upon those who have the disposal of offices to make appointments upon that principle similar to the obligation which exists between parents and children; and to make appointments upon any other principle, involves a species of dishonesty and injustice. I may also observe, that it

involves dishonesty and injustice against the public as well as against individuals. Officers are created, not for the purpose of party patronage, but, for the public good. The public therefore have a right to the employment of the best qualifications and talents (regardless of parties or party interests) in those offices. To use the patronage of those offices therefore for any party purposes is not only a perversion of them from the very design of their creation, but a wrong against the public. The late Councillors have been compelled to admit this principle in respect to the office of magistrates. They have been compelled to declare that magistrates ought to be appointed without regard to party distinctions. And are not all other offices created for the good of the public at large as well as that of magistrates? And are not the other offices for the most part more onerous upon the public than that of magistrates? And are not the public at large as much entitled to the full and impartial benefit of one public office as they are to that of another? In all probability, there cannot be more than one office holder to one hundred of the population. There are then the interests of ninety-nine to one in favour of having public offices filled according to qualifications and merit, "irrespective of party considerations." Neither the Sovereign nor the public have any interest in parties or party appointments. Partisans only are interested in party appointments: the public at large are interested in appointments according to qualifications and merits. Offices are created for the public at large and not for partisans or parties. The whole theory, therefore, of party appointments, and party patronage, is rotten at the very foundation. It is alike at variance with the fundamental principles of civil government and the first principle of morals. It is the original fountain of political corruption, and the death-knell of equal civil rights and privileges amongst all the members of a community. It is both the effect and the source of public corruption. It assumes that a people cannot be governed without this partial and therefore corrupt patronage of the Crown; and it makes them more corrupt.

The emulations and pretensions of party to public favour, should, therefore, rest upon other grounds than that of party patronage.—The sphere of the operations is beneath the throne—not above it. The exercise of the functions should not taint the fountain of honour, and justice, and law. That should be held sacred by all parties, and flow on unpoluted by party, to the humblest inhabitant of the land. The emulations of parties in regard to patronage itself should be, who shall advise its exercise most disinterestedly and most efficiently for the encouragement of virtue and intelligence—for the interest of the public service, for the discouragement of party contentions and divisions—for the promotion of peace and good will. Their emulations in regard to measures should be, who will devise and carry into effect the most numerous, most comprehensive, most simple, and most effi-