

evil, and the means of cure. There are, I conceive, certain principles in the young mind, coeval almost with the first dawns of reason, of which advantage is not taken as it ought to be, either in the composition of our Latin grammars or in the school training of youth.

Among the various operations of the thinking principle in man, which it has pleased mental philosophers to classify and describe under the name of "powers" and "faculties," there are few of which we do not find traces, more or less fully developed, in the lower animals. Not only do they possess the five senses, but in processes which are purely mental, such as memory, they may challenge a comparison with man. Even of the reasoning faculty—our boasted pride and privilege—we can scarcely doubt the existence and exercise; in the dog, for example, and the elephant, who are swayed by motives, compare the respective weight of each, and arrive at conclusions which regulate their movements with a will as free as our own. How this process is carried on without the gift of language and the use of words is to us incomprehensible, and we cover our ignorance by calling it instinct.

But among the faculties peculiar to man of which we find no trace in the lower animals, such as the perception of mathematical truth, there is one which we must, I think, admit to be as exclusively the attribute of man as the gift of speech itself,—I mean that act of the mind which prompts and enables him to reflect on the facts of his own present or past consciousness, and to make them the subject of thought and meditation. There is no evidence to prove, nor reason to believe, that even the animals I have mentioned—the most thinking and sagacious of the lower creation—ever turn their thoughts inwards to reflect on what is passing in their own minds, or ever recall past impressions, to subject them to consideration, reflection, or revision. The sensations that pass through their minds, be they pleasant or painful, are not forgotten: they are treasured up and recur in similar circumstances, and serve to regulate their conduct in pursuing the pleasure and avoiding the pain. But this is *memory*, not *meditation*; not that retrospective and prospective faculty—that power which makes man what Shakspeare calls him, "A being of large discourse, looking before and after,—the power of summing up the results of past observation and experience, of combining, comparing, abstracting, generalizing, and deducing, which more even than his bodily structure gives man his vast superiority over all other animal natures. Now, this distinctive privilege of our species is capable of being developed in the young mind much earlier than is commonly imagined. Even in the elementary stage of English education, before the child has left the infant school, there is room for appealing to the principle I speak of; as, for example, when he is called on to distinguish the form of each letter by the *eye*, and its power by the *ear*, and then to combine the two impressions into an audible sound. There are so many occasions for exercising the reflective faculty before he arrives at the age of seven or eight, when it is proper or at least usual to begin the study of Latin, that it is then eminently fit to be employed in prepossessing his mind in favour of the study, and investing it with an interest which, in the ordinary way of teaching, is seldom or never felt.

If this reflective faculty be directed to a luminous exposition of the simpler leading truths of general grammar—truths which are nothing more than the principles which guide man in the use and application of language, they will be at once apprehended and mastered by a boy, because he recognises in them what his own consciousness, when thus appealed to, assures him must be true. And it is scarcely necessary to add that, when the experiment is successful, and it can scarcely ever fail, it invests the subject to the young mind with a delight and interest most influential in promoting his further progress. By such a process as this should the mind be stimulated into activity, before the tyro is called on to grapple with the difficulties of flexion, conjugation, and syntax.

As far as my own experience goes, I do not find that, either in the practice of teaching, or in the Latin grammars in ordinary use, advantage is taken of the reflective principle, or any credit given or appeal made to it. Memory is the faculty almost alone called into exercise, and it is a memory not of that suggestive, philosophical kind which arranges a series of facts under one principle, so that they are easily retained and readily recalled; but a dry, mechanical, disjointed memory of insulated, ill-assorted ideas, difficult to acquire and very liable to be forgotten. The boy is often charged, under pains and penalties more or less severe, to remember and repeat a mass of formal rules without reasons, instead of being trained, by appeals to his own consciousness, to think, to reason, and to conclude.

The limits of this paper will allow me to take one or two instances only in explanation and illustration of the views and principles I have endeavoured to explain: and the first shall be from the Latin VERB—the word *κατ' ἔχθη*—the very key-stone of the arch of every sentence, without which, expressed or understood, there can be no

proposition,—a part of speech indeed which requires, more than any other, the helping hand of Philosophy to prevent it from confounding the budding intellect, and producing dislike of the whole subject.

Bearing in mind, then, that our main object is to carry the understanding of the boy along with us in the instruction given, I would curtail very considerably the *paradigma* of the Latin verb, as it appears in our grammars and is taught in our schools. The only moods or phases of the verb which I would retain in the tabular form should be: 1st. The Imperative of the second person, because in it we find the root or simplest form or element of the verb; 2nd. The Indicative or Declaratory—the mood by which the communication of consecutive thought and information is effected; 3rd. The Infinitive, as constituting the Noun of the verb; and 4th. The Participle, as representing its Adjectival form. The Subjunctive, Gerunds, and Supines, having nothing corresponding in our own language, I should omit for the moment, as only tending to confuse a boy's ideas. Then, as to the Tenses, there is a singular want of philosophy and consideration as to the manner in which they are presented to the young mind. Six tenses are ranged under the heading of the Indicative Mood, called Present, Imperfect, Perfect or Preterite, Pluperfect, and two Futures. Nor is there anything to inform the boy to what division of *time* they respectively belong, or to give prominence to one above the other; and after the whole is committed to memory, the pupil is left with very crude notions of the precise meaning of each. Now, the great divisions of time are practically known to a boy ever since he understood the terms yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow. But the abstract conception of time present, time past, and time to come, are not likely to have occurred to him till the reflective faculty is brought into action, when he at once recognises the distinction. What, then, so natural and so intelligible as to commence his acquaintance with the Tenses by putting him in possession of the words, and only the words, which mark these grand epochs in their simplest chronological succession: *Scripsi*, I wrote; *Scribo*, I write; *Scribam*, I shall write; or to concede so far to the universal practice of starting from the passing *now*, and looking back to the past and forward to the future—*Scribo*, *scripsi*, *scribam*; in Greek, *γράφω*, *ἔγραφα*, *γράψω*. The *paradigma* of the indicative would thus be completed for the time by these three tenses, and a clear and distinct basis laid for adding, at a subsequent period, either in a separate grammar, or in a smaller type and subordinate position under each head, the modifications and restrictions required in the ordinary use of speech. The present tense, though by no means limited in its use to the *punctum mobile* that separates the past from the future, has no variety of termination or form either in Greek or Latin; nothing equivalent to the English duplicate, I write, or I am writing. *Scripsi*—*ἔγραφα*—the great historical tense—simply refers the event or condition intimated by the verb to time past, and therefore is or ought to be called in Latin as it is in Greek, the Aorist, *i.e.* indefinite. But the line of Past Time is notched, as it were, at certain intervals, to which distinct forms (or subordinate tenses) are attached, according as the event or condition is spoken of, as (1) in a state of continuance when another took place, or, (2) as being connected with, or its influence carried on, to the present time, or, (3) as being past in relation to another also past. The first of these cases gives the imperfect *scribebam*—*ἔγραφον*—I was writing; the second gives the pluperfect *scripseram*—*ἔγεγράφειν*—I had written; and the third gives the present-perfect, which in English is—I have written, but which in Latin has no form to express it different from the preterite or aorist—*scripsi*—I wrote. That this is a deficiency in the Latin language must, I think, be admitted from the translation I have given, and yet in no grammar I have seen is this defect indicated in the *paradigma* of the verb, none in which *scripsi* is given and inflected a second time in a subordinate sense, as it ought to be, that the grand *paradigma* of the verb may be complete. *Scripsi* is universally put down under the title of "preterite" or "perfect," and translated—I wrote or have written, as if these were synonymous terms. And this is more strange, as the deficient form exists in the Greek *ἔγραφα*. The complement of past tenses therefore in Greek is—

ἔγραφα	in Latin—	<i>Scripsi</i> ,	I wrote.
ἔγραφον	"	<i>Scribebam</i> ,	I was writing.
ἔγεγράφειν	"	<i>Scripseram</i> ,	I had written.
γράψω	"	<i>Scripsi</i> ,	I have written.

Future time in Latin has two distinct forms—*Scribam*—*γράφω*—I shall write, expressing a simple reference to the time to come, an aorist of the future, as it might be called; and *Scripsero*, I shall have written, expressing an event, future indeed, but contemplated as finished before an event also future, but more, remote has happened. And it might be mentioned as another proof how little philosophy has been applied to the scheme of the verb, that lately *Scripsero* was relegated to the subjunctive mood. Omitting