

dealing with both threat and risk to those sets of interests;" and, 2) "to provide students, the attentive public, and elected and appointed officials with a source of analysis and understanding about how Canada's foreign and defence policy is made and implemented in the areas vital to its role in international peace and security." However, that bridge was essentially being built to a large extent on an ostensibly Westphalian foundation, even though the authors recognized that "the concept of security and the notion of defence, both fundamental aspects of the way the interstate system has been formed since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648," had come under scrutiny at the end of the Cold War. I say that the bridge between foreign and defence policy being constructed by Dewitt and Leyton-Brown was to a large extent based on Westphalian pillars because to a lesser extent it was being built on something else as well.

In recognizing that certain threats to the state and to society within the state do not necessarily always come in the form of military offensives, Dewitt and Leyton-Brown suggest that a country's security policy should acknowledge

that, in addition to the potential effect of war and other forms of external violence, conflict, and instability, boundaries are not impermeable, that uncontrolled penetration by people, goods, services, ideas, culture, or even effluent might be considered an aspect of the security agenda if such activities are perceived as putting core values and institutions at risk.⁵

Herein lies a departure from the Westphalian position on security. By recognizing that threats or challenges to national security are not always military in nature, and that military forces are not the only instruments of security policy, Dewitt and Leyton-Brown open the door for a challenge to the realist and neo-realist conception of security which essentially maintains that the state is central to the subject of security.

The state, in such views, is usually presented as a rational, autonomous, actor operating in an environment which is filled with similar actors. Since there is no supranational actor to keep these players in check, the operating environment is therefore one of a Hobbesian "state of nature" or anarchy. As each state desire greater power (power maximisers) in order to protect itself from possible attacks on its sovereignty, territory and population, a security dilemma is created. That understanding of security privileges the state as the subject of security and concludes that anarchy is the eternal condition of international relations. But what if the state is not the only subject of security? What if one can conceive of the individuals within the state as the subjects of security, or of the globe as a whole as the subject of security? Those are the implicit questions raised by Dewitt and Leyton-Brown and they are addressed using the conceptual architecture of cooperative security.

According to the above authors, this new security architecture is designed using the following: 1) multilateral strategy; 2) assurance rather than deterrence; 3) an approach that complements, co-exists with and in some cases may replace bilateral security arrangements; 4) an approach which promotes both military and non-military tools of security; 5) multilateral arrangements and institutions that are flexible and adaptive; 6) regimes of norms, principles, and practices of transparency to counter the erosive nature of the security dilemma.⁶

The concept of cooperative security, while still falling within problem solving and statist