

**ON-GOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION:
LEARNING FROM THE IAEA/UNSCOM EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ**

INTRODUCTION

In a statement made before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives on November 10, 1993, Lynn E. Davis, Under-Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, identified non-proliferation as the arms control priority of the post-Cold War world. In addition to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ballistic missiles and advanced conventional weapons, she included the technologies necessary for their development as representative elements of the most critical security threat faced today. Clearly, the Clinton administration has accorded a high priority to its non-proliferation agenda.

Not surprisingly, Canada's concerns relating to non-proliferation, as outlined in Session #1 of this workshop, closely parallels that enunciated by the United States administration. Indeed Canada joined with its NATO colleagues in the final communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, in Athens, Greece on June 10, 1993 in a commitment to remain determined to pursue NATO arms control objectives "in particular in the field of non-proliferation." Once thought of in almost exclusively global terms, the threats to proliferate -- even in the nuclear weapons area -- have now taken on a distinct regional dimension. With the decline of bipolarity, the legitimacy of multilateral corrective action is growing, and the United Nations seems on the verge of taking its place at the heart of a new approach to constrain proliferation.

The challenge we are facing today is not merely confusion caused by "old think", but, for some, a lingering doubt as to the ultimate efficacy of the present supplier dominated approach to non-proliferation. The old principles may ultimately prove counter-productive if they remain the sole focus of policy in the decade ahead. Such an emphasis could alienate rather than attract states in developing world. Particularly with the demise of the Cold War, it is regional instability and conflicts which dominate security concerns of most states. Non-proliferation, if it is to be successful as a primary containment tool in the global arms control and disarmament process, must be seen to be at least as beneficial to the security interests of the developing world as it is to the developed one.

In terms of regional agendas, the "stand-offs" on the Korean peninsula and in the Gulf area are occupying centre stage. There are, however, significant differences between the two. Indeed, just as James Macintosh cautioned in his presentation in Session #2 that CBMs may not "travel well" from one region to another, transfer of non-proliferation scenarios may require delicate