

find specific issues -- ranging from concepts of "honour" and "face," to styles of decision-making, to attitudes towards conflict and violence -- that projected themselves "upwards" from the society to the international arena. This is not surprising, since culture has to be rooted ultimately in the lived experiences of people and groups. Four distinct clusters of issues seemed to emerge as important, in an ascending (and often nested) order from the micro to the macro-social level:

- personal or individual social stances;
- collective decision-making and implementation styles;
- socio-cultural attitudes; and
- concrete institutional expressions of the above.

Before addressing them, however, it must be noted that the interface between domestic and "international" cultures (or elite versus mass/popular culture) is also the most subject to instrumental manipulation and entrepreneurial political leadership. By definition, if a security culture includes those enduring characteristics that influence the behaviour and thinking of political elites, these characteristics must have *some* foundation in the broader "popular" culture from which they arise. But this does not mean that popular or domestic political cultural factors should be understood as a straitjacket that imprisons political leaders. Instead, they should be seen as forming the "language" of security politics in which all new proposals (and opposition to them) must be expressed. While domestic cultural factors thus set the broad parameters of what can and cannot be accomplished, the language can also be used more or less "fluently" (or authentically) by different political elites or leaders. One prominent example often cited is the different public perceptions of the Israeli Labour Party leaders Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin. As Gabriel Ben-Dor (and others) have pointed out, although Peres often presented himself a diplomatic visionary for peace, in contrast to the gruff ex-soldier Rabin, this stance did not resonate nearly as well with the Israeli public. Their policies may have been similar, but in the election battle against Benjamin Netanyahu, Peres did not "speak the language" of contemporary Israeli politics.¹⁵

The first cluster of issues, which implicate the individual's place and standing in society, included issues of face and honour, questions of prestige and status, and specific roles (such as a "macho" orientation of confrontation). In Latin America, for example, great emphasis is placed on issues of personal standing and "face," and this is tied up with a masculine and status-oriented political culture. In the Middle East, "an extreme preoccupation with honour and shame [makes]...it difficult to concentrate on rational accommodations to end conflict without the satisfaction of revenge."¹⁶ Similar issues of "face" are important in Asia, where no agreement is often better than one in which face has been compromised. By contrast, it is worth underlining that "American negotiators [and Westerners more generally] do not display the obsession with face so characteristic of collectivist cultures, and hence often follow "the maxim that any agreement is better than no agreement."¹⁷ Not surprisingly, these sorts of micro-level issues translate into particular styles of decision-making and the exercise of authority. In Latin America, for example:

¹⁵ Gabriel Ben-Dor, personal communication.

¹⁶ Ben-Dor, 165.

¹⁷ Cohen, 132. See also Stella Ting-Toomey and Mark Cole, "Intergroup Diplomatic Communication: A Face Negotiation Perspective," in Felipe Korzeny and Stella Ting-Toomey, eds., *Communicating for Peace: Diplomacy and Negotiation* (London: Sage, 1990), 77-95.