

conditions for observers were inadequate and the Soviets did not provide information or notification for anything not strictly called for in the Final Act.

In addition to the review of CBM implementation, a number of proposals were advanced suggesting new Confidence-Building Measures or extensions of existing ones. The Soviet Union tabled a draft that included the suggestion for a treaty regarding no first use of nuclear weapons, an agreement to limit alliance membership to existing levels, a 50,000 to 60,000-man ceiling on manoeuvres, and the suggestion that Helsinki CBMs might be extended to include southern Mediterranean states. These proposals were not well disguised attempts to handicap NATO. A no-first-use treaty would, from NATO's perspective, deprive it of a vital component in its defence policy. The membership restriction was simply aimed at keeping Spain out of NATO. The 60,000-man ceiling would restrict NATO's ability to exercise effectively diverse forces.

The Western states responded with a proposal of their own, submitted by Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. They proposed that the manpower floor for the notification of manoeuvres be dropped to 10,000 and that the information provided about the manoeuvres be much more detailed. Their proposal also suggested a thorough code of conduct for the treatment of observers. Finally, it called for the compulsory notification of all major military movements (as distinct from manoeuvres) exceeding 25,000 men. The Warsaw Treaty Organization states rejected this proposal because of its unacceptable focus on extracting what to them was unwarranted information.

The NNA states advanced a proposal of their own calling for, amongst other things, clarified Helsinki CBMs. It contained a modified definition of a major manoeuvre that included the aggregation of a number of smaller manoeuvres held in close proximity or in close succession. In addition, it called for more precise information in the notification announcements and a code of conduct for observer treatment (including greater freedom and better conditions for observers). Finally, the proposal addressed the need for the notification of naval manoeuvres and suggested that information on military budgets might serve as a useful CBM.

The entire collection of new and revised CBM proposals advanced by each negotiating group failed to achieve the necessary support, and the prospects for any progress in the CBM area looked as dim as they did in other review areas. The neutral and non-aligned states, supported by Romania, attempted to circumvent the lack of consensus by suggesting that a separate group of experts meet to consider a number of new CBM proposals. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was much in favour of this idea as each feared that such a conference would be turned to the benefit of the other.

The formulation of a concluding document acceptable to all participant States proved to be almost impossible. The Soviet Union refused to accept draft proposals that highlighted failures to implement the Final Act. The United States and the Western states refused to accept a document that implied there were no problems with implementation (particularly in the area of human rights and basic freedoms). After many efforts at compromise, a largely meaningless document was produced by Denmark on March 4, 1978 that did little more than carry the Helsinki process forward to Madrid and the next follow-up conference.

### *The Madrid Follow-up Conference*

In the period prior to the beginning of the Madrid Review Conference, many of the participating States publicized schemes for improving the Helsinki CBMs. The Warsaw Treaty Organization indicated a willingness to lower the floor on major manoeuvres to 20,000 troops and also spoke of notifying air and naval manoeuvres. Of greater importance, the French government clarified its proposal of May 1978 for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), suggesting that it be convened after the completion of Madrid, that it deal with conventional weapons and forces only, that its provisions be mandatory and that it encompass all of Europe including all of the European portion of the Soviet Union. The conference would have two phases. The first would deal with CBMs while the second (paralleling efforts in the MBFR talks) would attempt to negotiate reductions of conventional forces. The Soviets also floated a proposal for what they called a European Conference on Military Detente. Unlike the French proposal, this one would be independent of the CSCE.

