was being threatened by the increased incidence of insurgent uprisings and border clashes along the 38th parallel. To assist the Commission to report on "developments which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea" the General Assembly in its resolution of October 21, 1949, authorized the appointment of military observers.\* As the hope of making progress toward the unification of North and South Korea faded, the Commission remained to try to serve as a stabilizing influence in Korea, which might, by its presence, prevent open conflict, and in the event of an armed outbreak, keep the United Nations fully informed. The record clearly indicates that the United Nations took every peaceful step open to it to assist the Koreans to achieve national independence and unity and to try to head off possible conflict.

The members of the Security Council already had, then, a good deal of background information about Korea when this complaint of aggression against the Republic of Korea was brought before the Council on June 25. Furthermore, inasmuch as the United Nations had assisted in the creation of the new Republic and had kept its Commission in Korea at the request of the Republic, this act of aggression could be regarded as a challenge to the organization itself.

After considering the reports which it had before it, the Security Council concluded that it already had sufficient information to label the North Korean aggression as a clear breach of the peace. By a vote of 9 to 0, with one abstention (Yugoslavia) and one absence (U.S.S.R.) the Security Council adopted a resolution on June 25† calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the North Korean armed forces to the 38th parallel. The United Nations Commission on Korea was asked to observe the North Korean withdrawal, keep the Security Council informed and make recommendations on the situation as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, all members of the United Nations were requested to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

On June 26 the Korean Commission sent four further reports to the Secretary-General. One described the North Korean peace offensive in June as "intended solely for its screening effect".‡ It concluded that "all evidence continues to point to a calculated co-ordinated attack prepared and launched in secrecy." Another message said that from past experience the Commission was "convinced North Korea will not heed Council resolution nor accept Commission's good offices." A further message gave it as the Commission's view, in the light of all reports available, including those of its military observers, that the North Korean attack was

†See Appendix 3. ‡See Appendix 4.

<sup>\*</sup>See Appendix 1 for text of General Assembly resolution of October 21, 1949.