does this appear that it makes us rub our eyes to find eminent writers maintain that nationality rests on an implied contract between the state and the subject. In a claim of damages on behalf of a child for injuries sustained by it in a railway accident before its birth, the Irish Court of King's Bench held that the company was not liable because they had made no contract with the child, and one of the judges said " in law, in reason, in the common language of mankind, a woman is the common carrier of her unborn child and not a railway company." Whether the company might have been held liable apart from contract is another question, but the case brings home to us the moral that an unborn child cannot make a contract, and consequently that it cannot agree to be born an Englishman or a Frenchman.

The fundamental problems of nationality are three: (1) What persons are members of the state, how do they become such, and how may they cease to be members of it? (2) What is the position of those who are within a state but do not belong to it? (3) What claim has the state upon members of these two classes, respectively?

If we were discussing nationality in general, the most convenient term for the members of the state would be "nationals," because all states do not call their members by the same name. But from the domestic point of view it is best to denote the members of the state as " British subjects," a time-honoured name which can still stir the blood like the Roman's *civis Romanus sum*.

The first question then is—Who are British subjects and how do they become such? British subjects fall into four groups: (1) Natural-born British subjects by common law. (2) Natural-born British subjects by virtue of certain statutes. (3) British subjects by naturalization. (4) Married women and minors, who have become British subjects as dependents.

Group one comprises all persons born within the King's dominions, or, as the venerable phrase ran, "within the ligeance of the King." In addition to children actually born