go there expecting to be taught, not for the purpose of personal investigation, and to learn from the great facilities placed at their disposal. Few have either the aptitude or application necessary for theoretical study. Nor does it appear to be necessary for the majority to take more than a practical course. Those who develop particular apti tude, and those only, should be retained for lurther instruction during the winter.

It is also necessary that the officers of the station should be relieved of the routine instruction and allot some time for theoreticul and practical investigation, otherwise no

Progress will be made,
The torpedo school differs from most scientific and practical institutions in that there are no text books, and few points dotermined by experiment. The whole subjuct is yet in an indefinite state, and som body of facts must be accomulated, in order to have a subject to teach. The torpedo boats Intrepid and Alarm have been completed, but owing to the advanced season, fewer experiments have been made with either to determine their capabilities.

The experiments recently made abroad show that little reliance is to be placed on

Товгеро Startov (Украї В Т., Ось. 23, 1874)

WILLIAM M. JEFFERS, Chief of Bureau. I have the honor to be etc.

most important means of offence and dements to develop the capabilities of this recommend liberal appropriations for experiis destined to play an important part in fu-ture inaval operations. We are at least as far advanced as others, but I take leave to serious attention of all maritime powers, and This new efement is however, attracting the ettention as well as other methods of attack Yorv with monitors as bases for moveable torpedos, and swilt torpedo bosts, will be required. The movemble torpedo be required. The movemble torpedo yet in its infancy, is receiving great opinion that for the defence of our large harbors, (such as New York), the sid of the plication of oables and great risk of accident and failure. This bureau is therefore of the effect being quite limited, these machines must be very numerous, entailing a com portant harbors. The radius of destructive stationary torpedoes for the defence of im-Hon. G. M. Robeson, Secretary of the Navy.

Sir: We have the honor to submit herewith our report of the examination of the graduating class of students attached to this station, which we have witnessed in accord ance with the orders of the department.
The following are the subjects of examination, viz : electricity ; explosive ; fuze mak.

The management and use of all kinds of torpedoes under different circumstances, and experiments made with various explo

It is very satisfactory to the board to be able to say that these examinations, both in the manner in which they were conduct ed and in the proficiency of the students, afford the strongest assurances of the competency and fidelity of the instructors, as well of the zeal and capacity of the students. The board is persuaded that the objects pursued at this station, the course of instruction and discipline, and their special and general results, promise to be of vital importance to the future usefulness and efficiency of the naval service. We have the honor to be etc.

C. H. Davis, Rear-Admiral and President; A. C. Rhind, Captain; Rich'd W. Meade, Commander; W. A. Kirkland, Commander; Chester Hatfield, Commander; russian and English Manœuvres.

As a cure for the melancholy Englishmen are apt to feel about any movement from which the gilt of novelty has worn off, and as a fair comparison upon points really admit of being stated in parallel columns, we know of no article of recent date which is more interesting, or which has given us more real pleasure than the one Captain Henry Knollys. R. A., has contributed to Black wood's Magazine. It has not attracted half the attention it deserves, and we unreserve edly commend it as a tonic to the weak, and a stimulant to the depressed. It is written to check our excessive spirit of self-depreciation, which amounts, at times, to positive self flagellation, after the manner of fanatics. He begins by quoting some words of General Blumenthal, uttered in 1871, as to our tactical errors in the course of our autum manœuvres not being, by any means "in excess of those which habitually occur" in Germany. Captain Knollys more than shows the truth of this statement. In fact, when summing up, towards the end, he declares himself as follows:—"Do we, in the course of our exercises, from time to time, comit tactical errors? So do they, and to a much greater extent. I can honesty assert—and I believe I shall not be contradicted by the other officers who were presentthat, in this respect, we have fallen into the habit of underrating the standard of excellence whereunto we have attained. errors and absurdities which occurred on the occasions referred to were so frequent and so grave that, had they been committed during our own autumn manœuvres, they would have been followed by an instant and public outburst of condemnation." Distance. in this as in other cases, lends enchantment to the view. We have detailed accounts of the mistakes made by our own soldiers, and and we fancy they never occur. The scenery at hand is broken; in the distance it is bold and striking.

Nor is this mere surmise. Captain Knollys writes from experience. He was present at the recent maneuvres in the vicinity of Berlin and Hanover, and he writes out his notes fairly and equitably. They ought to be read by every officer in Her Majesty's Service, and if some civilians, who are Prussian mad, whould study them carefully be fore making their next onslaught upon our silly manœuvres and inferior soldiers, it would do them good all around. Captain Knollys thinks the Prussian infantry very good, and "little inferior to our best English regiments." The cavalry were but in lish regiments." differently mounted, whilst the artillery had "sorry specimens" in the way of horses, and their "ill fitting, ill cared for, and slenderly constructed harness and accessories were huddled on in a slovenly manner." He adds that were the very slackest of our bat. teries to venture to preset themselves in public, turned out in the style of crack Prussian batteries, their cendition would be pronounced eminently discreditable." This criticism is backed by the remarks of a Prus sian officer as to the English artillery, which he says is " most excellent," as we honestly believe it to be. When we enlarge the comparison, and come to the Militia and the Volunteers, the parallel cannot be maintain. ed in our favor, and there is no advantage in maintaining the contrary. Coming to the macouvres themselves, it is noticed that there were precisely the same errors visible we manifest in this country; "the same must be impossible.

contests for outlying villages, and the same rush for the possession of important tactical points; the same periods of weary waiting, when everything seems to hang fire, and the same—or rather somewhat worse—in evitable blunders and absurdities." Capt. Knollys was present when General von Pape, the umpire in chief, summed up his criticisms on the two days' fighting near Berlin and the summary is not a little remarkable, It was noticed that the cavalry patrols were to strong, that their informa-tion was insufficient, and that cavalry commanders were too prone "to fight independent actions"; that the artillery fired at impossible ranges, failed to select good positions, and, on one occasion, came into action near a wood filled with skirmishers; and that the advance guard of the army was pushed on too far, whilst the intervals be-tween battalious and brigades had been too great. The fire of antagonists was generally held to be indestructive, and so on. The writer of the article makes a special point of the fact that a bivouse ground is selected. for the troops, just as it is with us, for the convenience of Control. Leaving these convenience of Control. Leaving these things to chance is to raise difficulties which mountable," can hardly be overcome by ourselves In the Hanover manœuvres he had no critiques to listen to, and makes his own observations, but the facts do not differ. The outpost duty was of "very ele" mentary nature": skirmishers blazed away into each others' faces, and their method of attack was at times, "confused and imperfect," The artillery came into action at impracticable ranges, and lost many opportunities by reason of pushing too far the principle of a concentrated overpowering fire. There batteries were "unguarded by any escort whatever." In fact, Captain Knollys asserts that English artillerists have not "much to learn from their Garman "Inere are other points in the article deserving of comment, but our object is only to generally indicate that in our manouvres we are by no means much, if at all, behind our supposed Prusssian models. They plan their campaigns beforehand, commit the same blunders, and have to bear the same reproofs. Indeed, if blunders were not committed in practice there would be no real instruction in the art of war. As General Blumenthal truly says, the object of such exercises is "to prevent the errors from getting too much shead," Such mistakes often occur in war -they occurred in the in the Franco German campaign often enough—and the value of preparatory train. ing is to reduce them, as far as possible, to a minimum.

We have supposed, says the London Army and Navy Gazette, that the oldest artillery officer living was Captain Robert A. Rollo, now on half pay, who joined the army, August 17, 1803, and has been captain since December 29, 1810. In column 172 of the "Army List" for November will be found the name of Captain C. C. Saxton, who has, it seems, held his present rank since November 10, 1796. The "Army List" makes Captain Saxton out to be a veteran indeed. The Comte de Chabot, father of the Comte de Jarnac, Ambassador of France at the Court of St. James's is, we believe, the old-est holder of a Royal Commission in the British service nowalive, for Captain Saxton