

things in the growth of concepts : first, that my expectation is no longer of all reds, *i.e.*, my red is no longer a general of the first degree. It is a particular as compared with green ; and second, my expectation is no longer that all my reds will be square. There will be circular, triangular, irregular reds ; *i.e.*, my red is still general as compared with particular instances of red. Now the particularizing of experiences in reference to one another is the function of perception, and this generalizing of experience, with reference to its own single instance, is conception—the general of the second degree. So conception and perception arise together.

At the same time, experience takes on another psychological aspect. New experience not only adds new items opposed to old items, but it leads to revision of the old. What passed for greens turn out to be part blues. So in my expectation of greens, I leave out the blues. So also I leave out the demand that my greens be either square, or circular, or triangular ; *i.e.*, I leave out figure. Or, to give a more concrete example, first, boat is boat, with spread sails, three masts and sailors in the rigging ; then sailors are dropped, sails and masts go, etc. What is left is ordinarily said to be abstracted, as, for instance, the concept colour, a quality

abstracted from particular instances. But true abstraction is not a singling out ; it is rather a paring down, a wearing off, an abrasion, due to the inconsistencies of new experiences with old. Thus is reached a general in the third degree. It represents that which is essential in an experience as tested by its uninterrupted recurrence amid shifting and drifting details.

How experience gets collected, related, distinguished, in this way is the question of the function of consciousness itself. I prefer to call the process apperception, and to say that both the percept and the concept arise by the apperceptive function of consciousness. They become, on this view, simply different aspects of one thing—a synthesis of elements. Looked at backward, the product is an event, a particular percept ; looked at forward, it is representative of other events, a general, a concept. The question of the relation of the two has largely lost its importance. The important question now is not how we get concept, but how we get anything, concept, percept, sensation. Recent work, especially in infant psychology, is showing that no line can be drawn sharply between generals and particulars. Every mental product is more or less general and, at the same time, more or less particular.

DISSIPATIONS AND THE YOUNG.

IT is not our present purpose to warn against dissipation in its more repulsive forms, but to draw attention to dissipations of a milder sort, to which the young are exposed, some of which, indeed, are deliberately put in their way by those older and supposedly wiser than themselves.

These dissipations are largely the product of our complicated modern

life. The literal meaning of the word is "to throw asunder, to scatter," and children now-a-days find themselves from infancy in the whirl of such distracting influences.

Especially is this the case in town and city life. The nursery is an antiquated institution. It has gone out of fashion. The baby, as soon as he is fairly on his feet, must be marched